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ABSTRACT 
 
Intelligent systems can facilitate decision making and have been widely applied to 
various domains. The output of intelligent systems relies on the users’ input. However, with 
the development of Web-Based Interface, users can easily provide dishonest input. Therefore, 
the accuracy of the generated decision will be affected. This dissertation presents three essays 
to discuss the defense solutions for malicious input into three types of intelligent systems: 
expert systems, recommender systems, and rating systems. Different methods are proposed in 
each domain based on the nature of each problem.  
 
The first essay addresses the input distortion issue in expert systems. It develops four 
methods to distinguish liars from truth-tellers, and redesign the expert systems to control the 
impact of input distortion by liars. Experimental results show that the proposed methods 
could lead to the better accuracy or the lower misclassification cost. 
 
The second essay addresses the shilling attack issue in recommender systems. It 
proposes an integrated Value-based Neighbor Selection (VNS) approach, which aims to 
select proper neighbors for recommendation systems that maximize the e-retailer’s profit 
while protecting the system from shilling attacks. Simulations are conducted to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the proposed method. 
 
The third essay addresses the rating fraud issue in rating systems. It designs a two-
phase procedure for rating fraud detection based on the temporal analysis on the rating series. 
xi 
 
 
 
Experiments based on the real-world data are utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
proposed method. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
More than ever before, it is apparent that the Internet and Web have changed our lives. 
Nowadays, more and more customers gather information from the Internet, e.g. product 
searching or vender comparison. Meanwhile, organizations could also utilize Web 
applications to retrieve information from their customers’ inputs, e.g. order placements or 
membership applications.  Despite the convenience, Web-based interfaces face significant 
challenges for data processing and decision making. Due to the availability of unprecedented 
amounts of online data, customers may not be able to retrieve their desired information 
efficiently while organizations could not process the customers’ inputs effectively. Hence, 
data analytics is used more often by organizations to help process information and make 
decisions. Accordingly, intelligent systems are becoming increasingly pervasive in 
organizations. 
 
Intelligent systems are systems with built-in artificial intelligence techniques. In their 
interaction with users or environment, intelligent systems can exhibit certain aspects of 
human intelligence including learning, reasoning, memory, adaptability, generalization, 
flexibility in problematic domains and temporal efficiency (Rudas and Fodor 2008).  Hereby, 
intelligent systems are capable of gathering information, understanding problems, drawing 
inferences, and generating solutions (Krishnakumar 2003). Given by the input data and 
embedded algorithms, intelligent systems can be designed to learn and make decisions in 
various problematic domains such as healthcare, financing, entertainment, and e-commerce.  
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From the organizational perspective, intelligent systems can facilitate decision 
making for two types of decision makers: internal employees and external customers. On one 
hand, organizational employees need to make decisions efficiently given by the tremendous 
amounts of input data, e.g. healthcare insurance application approval or loan application 
approval. Intelligent systems can help to make consistent and precise decisions. On the other 
hand, customers would like to make prior judgments for the risk of their potential future 
transactions from all of the available information, e.g. which item they may like or which 
seller may be reliable. Intelligent systems can assist them in finding the most useful 
information. Hence, applying intelligent systems could provide various advantages to 
organizations including accurate decision making, reduced decision cycle time and improved 
customer retention.  
 
Regardless of the type of the decision-maker, the output of the intelligent systems 
heavily relies on the users’ input. For example, a decision on loan applications can be 
generated based on inputs of customers’ personal information; the decision on a preferred 
item can be made according to inputs of customers’ historical purchasing behavior; the 
decision on seller’s reliability can be obtained through inputs of customers’ feedback. Thus, 
the users’ input is critical for the systems’ decision quality. With the evolution of Web 
technology, in particular Web 2.0 era, it is more convenient for customers to enter the 
information since they have access to systems from various locations through Web-based 
interfaces. This feature has delivered convenience for information collection. However, it 
brings a challenge to the input data quality. As users are providing information by themselves 
and it lacks face-to-face interaction, it is difficult to control the truthfulness of their inputs. In 
3 
 
 
 
this thesis, we generally term all users who inject dishonest information into the intelligent 
systems as malicious users regardless of their purposes and call their associated information 
as malicious inputs.  
 
The embedded algorithms for various types of intelligent systems are different. 
Hereby, although the information injected by all malicious users is fraudulent, they behave 
differently in various systems. In each type of intelligent system, malicious users have the 
specific objective and so do for malicious input data structure. In this thesis, we focus on 
three different types of intelligent systems: expert systems, recommender systems and rating 
systems. Herein, malicious inputs will bring different challenges in each type of systems.  
 
The first challenge is the input distortion issue on intelligent expert systems. Expert 
systems mimic human experts by applying expertise in a specific domain.  Given the users’ 
input, the systems can generate the decision based on the decision rules stored in advance 
into their knowledge base. However, users may not be willing to disclose their true personal 
information online except when required to. One possible reason behind this behavior is their 
concerns about privacy and security. They may falsify input data to protect themselves. 
Another important factor that contributes to this lying behavior is that self-interested 
customers may deliberately seek improper benefits by providing incorrect data. For example, 
during a credit card application, users who are not confident about their financial background 
may manipulate their partial information so as to get approval. Regardless of the reasons of 
lying, firms can incur significant costs as a result of incorrect input data. Such type of 
malicious input is termed as input distortion and users who distort their information are 
4 
 
 
 
called as liars. Input distortion not only decreases the recommendation accuracy, but also 
increases misclassification cost. In the real-world, misclassification costs are often 
asymmetric. For instance, classifying a non-worthy customer as a worthy one could 
potentially be much more costly than classifying a worthy customer as a non-worthy one. 
Thus, controlling the impact of input distortion from both the accuracy aspect and value 
aspect is necessary for designing the intelligent expert systems. 
 
The second challenge is the shilling attack issue on intelligent recommender systems. 
Recommender systems help customers find other users with the similar taste. Different from 
expert systems, there are no existing decision rules or knowledge bases stored within the 
systems in advance. Instead, they rely on various similarity- based techniques to find the 
object to be recommended. One of the most popular techniques adopted in recommender 
systems is collaborative filtering. For a particular customer (the active user), the collaborative 
filtering recommender systems will select a list of users who share the similar preference 
with the active user according to their historical behaviors. The selected users are called as 
neighbors. Based on the neighbors’ preference, it can predict the likelihood that a user would 
be interested in an item that he or she has not seen yet. Hereby, this type of system is 
vulnerable to malicious inputs from users who deliberately seek improper benefits. They may 
inject dishonest ratings to promote their own products, which are termed as the target items. 
They provide ratings for non-target items strategically as well so that the similarity between 
the shilling attackers and other normal users could increase. Accordingly, the target items 
could be recommended to other honest users more frequently. For the user who introduced 
biased information so as to lead to the improper recommendations, he or she is termed as 
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shilling attacker and his or her associated malicious input is termed as shilling attack. 
Different from input distortion behavior, shilling attacker attempts to affect the 
(recommendation) decision for another user (e.g. the new customer for a particular product), 
rather than for himself or herself. Even though the active user is willing to disclose the true 
preference, the recommendation for him or her will still be inaccurate as long as the 
information gathered from his or her neighbors is incorrect. Shilling attacks will impact the 
recommendation accuracy for customers, and further influence the customers’ satisfaction. In 
addition, a higher customers’ satisfaction is not equal to a higher e-retailer’s profit. From the 
e-retailer’s perspective, the ultimate goal is to increase profit (Das et al. 2010). Thus, it is 
critical to develop intelligent recommender systems to maximize the e-retailer’s profit while 
protecting them from attacks.  
 
The third challenge is the rating fraud issue on intelligent rating systems. Due to the 
anonymity in the Internet, it may be risky to interact with unfamiliar items or unknown 
sellers. Rating systems help customers to judge the quality beforehand and reduce the 
interaction-specific risk. Given by historical feedback from their users, rating systems 
calculate and disseminate the rating scores for a set of entities.  The success of a rating 
system is determined by the accuracy between the calculated ratings and the true quality of 
future interactions (Hoffman et al. 2007). However, in order to inflate the reliability of their 
products or tarnish that of their competitors’, some “users” may intentionally input unfairly 
high or low ratings for a particular set of sellers. Such a type of malicious input is termed as 
rating fraud and the user with such behavior is called as fraudulent rater. The rating fraud 
issue could affect the customers’ trust in rating systems, which will further affect their 
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motivation in participating into the future transactions.  Therefore, for organizations relying 
on customers’ online transactions, there is a great need to redesign the intelligent rating 
systems to defend with rating fraud. While both of the fraudulent raters in the rating systems 
and the shilling attackers in the recommender systems attack the systems by injecting the 
malicious ratings, their purposes and their behavior patterns are greatly different. First, an 
attacker in recommender systems attempts to make certain products more/less visible while a 
fraudulent rate in ratings systems intend to make certain products more/less reliable. In rating 
systems, all the products or sellers are visible to their potential customers with the equal 
chance. Buyers refer to the rating score to decide which product or seller to interact with. 
Second, in order to make products recommended more frequently, attackers in 
recommendation systems need to increase the similarity between their rating pattern and 
other users’.  Hereby, shilling attackers have to set up rating profiles to make their rating 
patterns quite similar to the majority normal users. It means that each shilling attacker should 
inject at least a certain amount of ratings, which is not the case for fraudulent raters. Actually, 
the reliability of rating systems may be greatly affected by a group of fraudulent raters each 
with only a couple of injected ratings, as long as the group size is above a certain level. 
 
Table 1.1 summarizes and compares the challenges induced by malicious inputs in 
each intelligent system domain. Facing these challenges, this dissertation aims to achieve the 
following research objectives: 
 
 Develop effective methods against input distortion from both accuracy and value 
perspectives; 
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 Develop effective methods against shilling attacks to satisfy customers’ needs as well 
as increase e-retailer’s profit; 
 
 Develop effective methods against rating fraud to improve the reliability of rating 
systems; 
 
Table 1.1 A Summary of Malicious Inputs Issues in Three Intelligence Systems 
 
Chapter Intelligent 
Systems 
Domains 
Malicious 
Inputs  
Malicious 
Users 
Malicious Users’ 
Purposes 
Chapter 2 Intelligent 
Expert Systems 
Input 
Distortion 
Liars Get the favorable decision for 
the liar 
Chapter 3 Intelligent 
Recommender 
Systems 
Shilling 
Attack 
Shilling 
Attacker 
Influence the decision for 
users other than the shilling 
attackers 
Chapter 4 Intelligent 
Rating Systems 
Rating 
Fraud 
Fraudulent 
Raters 
Influence the decision for 
users other than the 
fraudulent raters 
 
Table 1.2 A Summary of Detection Methods in Three Intelligence Systems 
 
Chapter Malicious Inputs Strategy Detection Method 
Proposed 
Evaluation 
Method 
Chapter 2 Utilize the existing decision 
rules to strategically manipulate 
the input information 
ST, CT, VST, VCT Real-world data 
and simulation 
Chapter 3 Inject ratings to the non-target 
items strategically to increase 
the similarity between attackers 
and the normal users 
Value Based 
Neighbor Selection 
Real-world 
normal data and 
simulated attack 
data 
Chapter 4 Provide unfair rating collectively 
to the target entity. 
Two Phase 
Temporal Analysis 
Method 
Real-world 
normal and attack 
data 
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Each of the three dissertation essays aims to achieve one of the objectives stated 
above with empirical studies in different intelligent systems domains. Table 1.2 summarizes 
the defense strategies proposed in each dissertation essay. Chapter 2 focuses on the analysis 
of coping with input distortion from liars in the deductive expert systems. We develop 
methods to distinguish liars from truth-tellers based on verifiable attributes, and redesign the 
expert systems to control the impact of input distortion. The four methods we propose are 
termed Split Tree (ST), Consolidated Tree (CT), Value-Based Split Tree (VST), and Value-
Based Consolidated Tree (VCT). By comparing the user-provided values and the verified 
true value for an attribute, it calculates the probability that a user is a liar, and the user is 
treated differently based on the probability. Among them, ST and CT aim to increase an 
expert system’s accuracy of recommendations, and VST and VCT attempt to reduce the 
misclassification cost resulting from incorrect recommendations. Experiments are conducted 
based on both real-world decision tree and simulated trees to compare the performances of 
the four proposed methods and two existing methods, i.e., the traditional method that ignores 
input distortion and the knowledge modification (KM) method proposed in a prior research. 
Results show that the proposed methods can lead to significantly better accuracy or lower 
cost than existing methods. This result further confirms the advantage of differentiating liars 
from truth-tellers when such distinctive groups exist in the population. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the discussion of dealing with shilling attackers in the 
collaborative filtering recommender systems. The precision of previous attack detection 
techniques deteriorates when the attack size or filler size is small, which indicates a larger 
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probability of misidentifying genuine users as attackers. In addition, seldom do the existing 
attack detection systems take into consideration the e-retailers’ profit when making 
recommendations. This essay integrates the profitability factor into the traditional systems 
under the attack environment and proposes an integrated Value-based Neighbor Selection 
(VNS) approach. It selects a proper list of neighbors for recommendation systems that 
maximize the e-retailer’s profit while protecting the system from shilling attacks. The 
proposed approach is evaluated by a real world dataset against two accuracy-based 
benchmarks and one value-based benchmark. Results have shown that the proposed approach 
has realized dual-goals of obtaining recommendation accuracy and sellers’ profits.  Its 
advantage is especially significant when either filler size or attack size is small.  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on designing defense mechanisms to detect collaborative rating 
fraud. In previous literature, the “majority rule” has been adopted as an effective fraud 
detection technique. By comparing users’ ratings of a particular item with its overall mean, it 
can judge which users are potential fraudulent users according to their rating deviation. 
However, when the majority of users are fraudulent, the accuracy of this detection technique 
will decrease. In this essay, it proposes the two-phase detection method based on the analysis 
of the rating series features. In the first phase, it examines the received rating series of each 
entity and filter out the entity which is under attack (termed as target entity). If the entity is 
not attacked by the fraudulent raters, its ratings should be random among each other. 
Otherwise, it is the target entity and the raters for the target entity are the potential fraudulent 
raters. In the second phase, it analyzes the rating series of each rater selected in the previous 
phase. Based on its temporal features, a group of fraudulent raters will be discriminated by 
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using clustering based method. The proposed fraudulent rater detection method is evaluated 
against a real-world cyber competition data set (Liu et al. 2011). The data set includes both 
normal data and attack data. Experimental studies have shown that the proposed method is 
effective in detecting the fraudulent raters accurately while keeping the majority of the 
normal users in the systems in various attack environment settings. 
 
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation, summarizing the proposed methods in each 
essay, stating its contributions to the malicious inputs and intelligent systems’ design, 
discussing its managerial implications in various industry domains, and presenting directions 
for further studies. 
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CHAPTER 2. DESIGNING INTELLIGENT EXPERT SYSTEMS TO COPE WITH 
LIARS  
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Expert systems are widely applied in diverse fields such as medical treatment, 
production management, and financial investing (Liao 2005). The mechanism behind expert 
systems is that they replicate experts’ knowledge in specialized domains in the form of 
decision rules. Given a set of inputs, expert systems produce recommendations to support 
decision-making. Organization can take advantage of expert systems to reduce the cost of 
human experts or make better decisions (Duan et al. 2005). 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two types of expert systems: inductive expert systems and 
deductive expert systems. Inductive expert systems are built using induction algorithms, 
which develop decisions rules based on pre-classified training datasets (Mookerjee and Dos 
Santos 1993). Deductive expert systems, on the other hand, are built on deductive algorithms, 
which derive rules based on existing knowledge base and additional evidence through 
deductive reasoning (Zhang and Wu 2010). Instead of learning decision rules from training 
data, decision rules for a deductive expert system could be directly provided by human 
experts. The focus of this study is on deductive expert systems. 
 
Internet technologies have provided new opportunities for the deployment and wider 
application of expert systems (Power 2000). Through Web-based interfaces, users can 
conveniently access an expert system from different locations, and recommendations can be 
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quickly delivered to them. However, along with the greater convenience, Web-based 
interfaces also bring real challenges, which we discuss next. 
 
2.1.1. Input Distortion 
Input distortion occurs when users do not provide true attribute values to a system. 
For instance, Hoffman et al. (1999) find that 95% of the users are reluctant to provide 
information requested by websites. One reason behinds this behavior is the lack of trust 
between customers and businesses on the Web today (Metzger 2004). Users’ concerns about 
their privacy and information security prevent them from revealing true information. 
Consequently, users may falsify input data to protect themselves. Another important factor 
that contributes to this lying behavior is that self-interested customers may deliberately seek 
improper benefits by providing incorrect data. For example, during a credit card application, 
users who are not confident about their financial background may manipulate their personal 
data in order to get approval. This type of lying behavior is further exacerbated by the fact 
that without face-to-face interaction with users, lying is more difficult and costly to detect.  
 
Regardless of the causes of lying, firms can incur significant costs as a result of 
incorrect data provided by customers. In the scenario of a credit card application, granting the 
card to high-risk customers can result in financial losses. On the other hand, incorrectly 
denying deserving customers can lead to loss of potential revenue and impair firm’s 
reputation.  
 
One intuitive method to deal with the falsified credit application is to impose penalty. 
Worsham (2010) has reported that prison sentences range from months to years and fines 
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upwards of $200,000 or more may be charged for falsifying data in a credit application. 
However, punishments are often costly to enforce, thus may have limited effect on the 
prevention of input distortion. Another possible method is to utilize incentive mechanisms to 
discourage users from lying. Incentive mechanisms are easy to carry out but their goals are 
hardly realized as long as users perceive the benefit of lying is greater than the offered 
incentive.  
 
Since input distortion is practically impossible to completely eliminate, one may 
suggest that all user inputs be manually verified to ascertain their accuracy. However, 
manually verifying user inputs for frequently used expert systems, such as one for consumer 
credit screening, is typically costly and time-consuming, thus offsetting the benefits of 
adopting such expert systems. Therefore, manual verification is not a feasible approach to 
deal with user input distortion for most expert systems. In this study, we focus on automatic 
approaches to address users’ lying to expert systems. 
 
2.1.2. Literature Review 
Human’s lying behavior has long been studied by researchers. One research stream 
deals with deception detection. Previous studies suggest that it is possible to use verbal and 
nonverbal cues to detect deception (Buller and Burgoon 1996; George et al. 2004). In 
addition, researchers have proposed methods to detect deception via linguistic cues (Zhou et 
al. 2003; Zhou et al. 2008; Zhou and Zhang 2008). However, these techniques for deception 
detection cannot be directly applied to address users’ lying behavior in our problem context. 
For example, during an online credit card application, an applicant may only be required to 
input numeric and simple text information (e.g., name and address). Without face-to-face 
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contact, it is impossible to capture non-verbal or verbal cues that are critically important for 
deception detection. Similarly, without rich text information, the linguistic methods cannot 
be applied. Furthermore, the aforementioned studies on deception detection do not address 
input distortion for expert systems.  
 
In another stream of research, researchers have developed sophisticated techniques to 
detect various fraud, such as management fraud (Cecchini et al. 2010), financial fraud 
(Abbasi et al. 2012), and fake websites (Abbasi et al. 2010). The methods proposed in this 
stream of research typically build on inductive machine learning algorithms, and require 
training data that includes a set of fraud cues or contextual information and known 
classifications. Such techniques cannot be easily applied to detect an individual user’s lying 
behavior because the required fraud clues and contextual information are often difficult to 
gather from users of deductive expert systems considered in the present research.  
 
The prior literature has also proposes methods to handle noises that can affect the 
effectiveness of inductive expert systems. For inductive expert systems, noisy data can affect 
the derived decision rules and subsequently the recommendations. One way of dealing with 
noisy data is enhancing the quality of training data. Various solutions have been proposed for 
this purpose, such as class noise identification (Brodley and Friedl 1999: Zhu et al. 2003), 
erroneous attribute value location (Zhu et al. 2004), and missing attribute value imputation 
(Fellegi and Holt 1976; Rubin 2004). One problem associated with this type of methods is 
that important information may be lost during this elimination process (Wu and Zhu 2008). 
Another important method is decision tree pruning, which could improve the tree 
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performance under noisy data (Quinlan 1986). Mookerjee et al. (1995) apply the pruning 
technique during the tree construction phase instead of after it. Boylu et al. (2010) adapt 
support vector machines (SVM) to generate classifications; their method takes into 
consideration users’ possible strategic behavior such as distorting data. To evaluate their 
relative performance, Zhou et al. (2004) empirically compare various noise handling 
techniques and find that only neural networks exhibited consistent performance. Although 
these solutions improve the performance of inductive experts systems, they all require that a 
similar error pattern exist in training and testing data, which is not applicable to deductive 
expert systems.  
 
For deductive expert systems, decision rules are typically provided by domain experts 
instead of induced from training data, hence we expect that noisy input data affects only the 
recommendations but not the decision rules used to build an expert system. When 
formulating decision rules, experts typically assume that the input data at the time of 
consulting will be accurate. However, as discussed earlier, this is often not the case. To cope 
with input distortion, Jiang et al. (2005) propose two novel methods to improve the accuracy 
of recommendations. The first method, termed Knowledge Modification (or KM), generates a 
new decision tree (termed KM Tree) based on experts’ decision rules as well as users’ lying 
patterns. At the time of consulting, users’ input data would be directly fed into the modified 
decisions tree. The second method, termed Input Modification, still uses the decision tree 
built from decision rules provided by experts, but modifies a user’s input data at the time of 
consulting. Jiang et al. (2005) show that both the Knowledge Modification method and the 
Input Modification method lead to a significantly improved accuracy than the traditional 
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method that ignores input distortion, with the Knowledge Modification method 
outperforming the Input Modification methods under practically all problem scenarios. 
 
Although the KM method proposed by Jiang et al. (2005) substantially increases the 
accuracy of recommendations under input noises, the method has two limitations. First, the 
generated KM Tree does not attempt to differentiate liars from truth-tellers at the time of 
consulting. Instead, all users’ inputs are directly fed into the same KM Tree in the same 
manner. Since the KM method essentially assumes that every user is a liar, it is not effective 
when there is a clear separation of liars and truth-tellers in the underlying user population. In 
fact, we find in the present study that when the proportion of truth-tellers is large, the 
performance of KM method often degrades, sometimes even to a level worse than the 
accuracy of the traditional method that completely ignores users’ lying behavior. Therefore, 
more intelligent methods that differentiate liars from truth-tellers are warranted under such 
scenarios. Second, the KM method does not consider misclassification costs when making 
recommendations. In the real-world, misclassification costs are often asymmetric. For 
instance, classifying a non-worthy customer as a worthy one could be more costly than 
classifying a worthy customer as a non-worthy one. The KM method maximizes the expected 
accuracy of recommendations while completely ignores such misclassification costs. This 
could lead to suboptimal decisions under some real-world applications. Hence, alternative 
methods that take into consideration misclassification costs are desirable for certain business 
applications. 
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2.1.3. Contributions 
To the best of our knowledge, no prior study differentiates liars from truth-tellers and 
considers misclassification costs when dealing with input noises for deductive expert systems. 
The present study fills this void and makes two important contributions. Our first major 
contribution is that we differentiate between liars and truth-tellers in all methods proposed in 
this study. By comparing the user-provided value and the verified true value for a selected 
attribute, we calculate the probability that a user is a liar, and the user may be treated 
differently based on the calculated probability. The first method we propose is termed Split 
Tree (ST). If a customer’s probability of liar is above a threshold, she is treated as a liar and 
her inputs are fed into a Liar Tree, which is built based on the pattern of input distortion by 
liars. Otherwise, she is treated as a truth-teller and the recommendation is generated using the 
True Tree (TT) built directly from decision rules provided by experts. The second method is 
referred to as Consolidated Tree (CT). By taking into consideration all input scenarios under 
both the True Tree and the Liar Tree, this method generates a new Consolidated Tree. For 
each possible input vector, the CT method always selects the recommendation with the 
highest probability of being accurate. We show that both ST and CT lead to better accuracy 
than the KM method proposed by Jiang et al. (2005). 
 
As the second major contribution, we take into consideration misclassification costs 
and propose two value-based methods that minimize the total misclassification cost resulting 
from incorrect recommendations. The first value-based method we propose extends the ST 
method, therefore it is termed Value-based Split Tree (VST). The second value-based method 
is modified based on the CT method and hence is named as Value-based Consolidated Tree 
(VCT). The primary difference between an accuracy-based method (ST or CT) and a value-
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based method (VST or VCT) is that the former generates recommendations that maximize 
accuracy, whereas the latter produces recommendations that minimize the expected 
misclassification cost. The two value-based methods can be considered generalizations of the 
accuracy-based methods, and are particular useful when misclassification costs are 
asymmetric.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We develop the two accuracy-based 
methods in Section 2.2 and the two value-based methods in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we 
report on the experiments conducted for performance evaluation. In Section 2.5, we address 
some practical issues related to the selection of attributes to determine whether a given user 
is a liar or not. We conclude the paper in Section 2.6 with discussions on managerial 
implications and future research directions.  
 
2.2. Accuracy-Based Methods 
Deductive expert systems make decisions based on decision rules that are typically 
provided by human experts. For better efficiency at the time of consulting, such decision 
rules need to be transformed into a decision tree, which is then used to generate 
recommendations based on inputs provided by users. To differentiate it from decision trees 
generated from other methods, we refer to the decision tree built directly from expert-
provided decision rules as the True Tree (TT).  
 
When the decision rules are formulated, experts implicitly assume that all attribute 
values provided by users are accurate. For instance, an expert may classify a customer who 
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claims to have medium income and full-time employment as low-risk. An implicit 
assumption behind this decision rule is that the customer indeed has a medium income and a 
full-time job. However, as discussed earlier, users may lie when providing inputs to an expert 
system. In the same example, if a customer who claims to have a medium income and a full-
time job is actually unemployed with no significant income, then classifying the customer as 
a low-risk one can lead to financial losses. As previously mentioned, facing such lying 
behavior, a KM Tree, built based on the KM method proposed by Jiang et al. (2005), can 
replace the True Tree to serve as the “expert” at the time of consulting. The KM method, 
however, does not differentiate liars from truth-tellers, and hence leaves room for 
improvement.  
 
In this section, we propose two accuracy-based methods that explicitly separate liars 
from truth-tellers: Split Tree (ST) and Consolidated Tree (CT). In constructing their own 
decision trees, both methods first estimate the probability that a particular customer is a liar, 
and then generate recommendations based on the calculated probability and a set of 
parameter values for the underlying user population. 
 
To illustrate the typical problem context for deductive expert systems and the 
different noise handling methods, we first present a credit risk assessment example that is 
similar to the one used by Jiang et al. (2005). 
 
2.2.1. A Credit Risk Assessment Example 
In order to decide whether to provide credit to potential customers, firms need to first 
assess their credit-worthiness. Human experts could provide a set of decision rules, as 
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illustrated in Table 2.1, that can be used for such an assessment. Based on rules represented 
in this table, a customer can be classified into three risk levels, i.e., low risk (LR), medium 
risk (MR) and high risk (HR), based on the values of four attributes: Income (high, medium, 
low), Bachelor’s Degree (yes, no), Employment (yes, no), and Bankruptcy (yes, no). The 
dash entry (“-”) in the table means that the value for that attribute “does not matter” for a 
given decision rule. For instance, rule R0 classifies a customer as low-risk as long as the 
customer’s income is high, regardless of whether the customer has a degree, a bankruptcy 
record, or a job. Since the decision rules shown in Table 2.1 are provided based on the 
assumption that all attribute values are correct, they represent the True Table. Based on 
heuristic algorithms, the True Table can be translated into a True Tree, as shown in Figure 
2.1. At the time of consulting, the True Tree, instead of the True Table, should be used 
because the former is more efficient than the latter. 
 
Table 2.1 Decision Table for Credit Risk Assessment 
Attributes 
Rules 
Income 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
Employment Bankruptcy Classification 
R0 H - - - LR 
R1 M Y Y - LR 
R2 M - N - MR 
R3 M N Y - MR 
R4 L - - Y HR 
R5 L - - N MR 
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Figure 2.1 True Tree for Credit Risk Assessment  
 
2.2.2. Probability of Being A Liar 
In order to estimate the probability that a particular user is a liar, we need to compare 
the value provided by the user and the corresponding true value for at least one attribute. The 
attribute used for the verification purpose should be relatively easy to validate. We call such 
an attribute Verifiable Attribute (or VA). In the credit risk assessment example, Bankruptcy 
could be used as a VA since it can be relatively quickly and cost-efficiently obtained from a 
customer’s credit report. Given both the observed and true values of a VA, denoted by VAO 
and VA
T
 respectively, the conditional probability that the user is a liar can be derived based 
on the Bayes’ Theorem: 
,
teller)-P(truthteller)-truth|P(P(liar)liar)|P(
P(liar)liar)|P(
) ,|P(liar



TOTO
TO
TO
, VAVA, VAVA
, VAVA
VAVA  (1) 
where 
), P(VA),VAP(VA)|VAP(VA TTO TO liarliar | liar,  ,  
teller)-truth,P(teller)-truth,P(teller)-truth|P( TTOTO VA | VAVA,VAVA  . 
Given (1), we have 
P(truth-teller | VA
O
, VA
T
) = 1− P(liar | VAO, VAT).           (2) 
MR 
Income 
high 
LR 
medium 
Employed 
yes no 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
 no 
LR MR 
low 
Bankruptcy 
yes no 
MR HR 
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The conditional and marginal probabilities in (1) can be obtained from historical data 
or through sampling. During the sampling process, a certain number of users are selected and 
their true attribute values verified. A user who lied about at least one attribute is classified as 
a liar; those who did not lie about any attribute are classified as truth-tellers. Based on this 
classification, we can estimate the distribution of liars and truth-tellers in the population, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.2. In addition, we can estimate the distortion matrixes for liars and 
truth-tellers for each attribute, as shown in Figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(b). We then calculate the 
distortion matrixes for the entire user population (including both truth-tellers and liars) for all 
attributes, as shown in Figure 2.3(c). In a distortion matrix, the rows represent the true values, 
the columns record the observed values, and the numbers captures the conditional probability 
of every observed attribute value given each true value. For instance, the first 0.3 in the liar’s 
distortion matrix for Income implies that among those whose true income is low, 30% are 
likely to claim that their income is high. Through sampling, we can also estimate the 
marginal distribution of true attribute values for both liars and truth-tellers, as shown in 
Figures 2.4(a) and 2.4(b). Here, the marginal distributions need to be separately estimated for 
liars and truth-tellers. The marginal distributions for the entire user population that includes 
both truth-teller and liars are calculated and shown as in Figure 2.4(c). Note that these 
distortion matrices and marginal distributions are similar to those estimated by Jiang et al. 
(2005). However, Jiang et al. (2005) do not estimate them separately for liars and truth-tellers. 
Instead, distortion matrices and marginal distributions are estimated based on data for all 
users in the sample, essentially the same as those shown in Figures 2.3(c) and 2.4(c). 
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Liar (L) 0.4 
Truth-Teller (T) 0.6 
Figure 2.2 Distribution of Liar and Truth-Teller 
 
Income (I) 
 High Medium Low 
High 0.85 0.075 0.075 
Medium 0.225 0.55 0.225 
Low 0.3 0.3 0.4 
 
Bachelor’s Degree 
(D) 
 Yes No 
Yes 0.9 0.1 
No 0.4 0.6 
 
Employed (E) 
 Yes No 
Yes 0.85 0.15 
No 0.90 0.10 
 
Bankruptcy (B) 
 Yes No 
Yes 0.11 0.89 
No 0.01 0.99 
 
Figure 2.3(a) Liars’ Distortion Matrices for Each Attribute 
Income (I) 
 High Medium Low 
High 1.0 0.0 0.0 
Medium 0.0 1.0 0.0 
Low 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 
Bachelor’s Degree 
(D) 
 Yes No 
Yes 1.0 0.0 
No 0.0 1.0 
 
Employed (E) 
 Yes No 
Yes 1.0 0.0 
No 0.0 1.0 
 
Bankruptcy (B) 
 Yes No 
Yes 1.0 0.0 
No 0.0 1.0 
 
Figure 2.3(b) Truth-Tellers’ Distortion Matrices for Each Attribute 
Income (I) 
 High Medium Low 
High 0.95 0.025 0.025 
Medium 0.09 0.82 0.09 
Low 0.245 0.245 0.51 
 
Bachelor’s Degree 
(D) 
 Yes No 
Yes 0.97 0.03 
No 0.2 0.8 
 
Employed (E) 
 Yes No 
Yes 0.94 0.06 
No 0.42 0.58 
 
Bankruptcy (B) 
 Yes No 
Yes 0.2 0.8 
No 0.002 0.998 
 
Figure 2.3(c) The Entire Population’s Distortion Matrices for Each Attribute 
 
Income (I) 
High 0.5 
Medium 0.3 
Low 0.2 
 
Bachelor’s Degree 
(D) 
Yes 0.55 
No 0.45 
 
Employed (E) 
Yes 0.65 
No 0.35 
 
Bankruptcy (B) 
Yes 0.45 
No 0.55 
 
Figure 2.4(a) Liars’ Marginal Distributions for Each Attribute 
Income (I) 
High  0.67 
Medium 0.3 
Low 0.03 
 
    Bachelor’s Degree (D) 
Yes 0.7 
No 0.3 
 
Employed (E) 
Yes 0.73 
No 0.27 
 
Bankruptcy (B) 
Yes 0.03 
No 0.97 
 
Figure 2.4(b) Truth-Tellers’ Marginal Distributions for Each Attribute 
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Income (I) 
High  0.6 
Medium 0.3 
Low 0.1 
 
    Bachelor’s Degree (D) 
Yes 0.64 
No 0.36 
 
Employed (E) 
Yes 0.7 
No 0.3 
 
Bankruptcy (B) 
Yes 0.2 
No 0.8 
 
Figure 2.4(c) The Entire Population’s Marginal Distributions for Each Attribute 
 
 
Given the distributions and conditional probabilities included in the distortion 
matrices, we can estimate the probability that a user is a liar given the true and observed 
values of an attribute. To illustrate, consider an observed vector (I
O = “H”, DO = “N”, EO = 
“N”, BO = “N”), representing the observed values of Income, Bachelor’s Degree, 
Employment, and Bankruptcy, and a verified true VA (Bankruptcy) value B
T
 = “N”. We next 
show how to use the numbers shown in Figures 2.2-2.4 to estimate the conditional 
probability that this customer is a liar. Based on (1), we first obtain 
0.99*0.55liar),N""(liar),N"" | N""(liar)|N"" ,N""(  TTOTO BPBBPB BP , and 
0.97.*1.0teller)truth-,N""(Pteller)truth-,N"" | N""(P       
teller)truth|N"" ,N"" (P


TTO
TO
BBB
BB
 
Then, 
0.272.
0.6*0.97*1.00.4*0.55*0.99
0.4*0.55*0.99
teller)(truth-Pteller)truth-|N"" ,N""(P(liar)Pliar)|N"" ,N""(P
(liar)Pliar)|N"" ,N""(P
)N"" ,N""|(liarP
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

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
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BBBB
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The result shows that even if the observed and true values of Bankruptcy are both “N,” 
the user still has a 27.2% chance of being a liar. This has an important implication. Even 
though the observed value is the same as the true one, it does not guarantee that the customer 
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is a truth-teller. On the other hand, a user is a liar with certainty if the observed value is not 
the same as the truth value. This can be verified based on (1). If B
O
 is not equal to B
T
, P(B
O 
| 
B
T
, truth-teller) = 0. Thus, P(liar| B
O
 ≠ BT) = 1. 
 
2.2.3. Split Tree Method (ST) 
Once the probability that a given user is a liar is estimated, we can decide whether to 
use the True Tree or a tree specifically built for liars, named Liar Tree, to generate 
recommendations. As shown in Figure 2.5, if the Threshold is set at 0.5, then the True Tree 
should be consulted if the probability that a user being a liar is 0.272, as calculated in the 
preceding example. On the other hand, the Liar Tree is consulted if the user’s probability of 
being a liar is higher than 0.5. We call this method a Split Tree (or ST) method. Under the ST 
method, the True Tree is directly constructed from the expert-provided decision rules; the 
Liar Tree can be built following the same steps for building a KM Tree (Jiang et al. 2005), 
with the exception that Liar’s distortion matrices and marginal distributions, instead of those 
for all users, are used. We next briefly describe the steps used to generate the Liar Tree. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Split Tree Structure 
 
To build the Liar Tree, we first need to calculate the Liar’s decision table (or Liar 
table), which includes recommendations for all possible observed vectors. For instance, for 
P(liar | VA
O
, VA
T
) 
≥Threshold < Threshold 
True 
Tree 
Liar 
Tree 
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the credit risk assessment example, there are 3×2×2×2 = 24 rules in the Liar table. Similarly, 
if there are 10 binary attributes, the fully enumerated Liar table will include 2
10
 rules. The 
recommendation for each possible observed vector is computed using the following steps: 
 
Step 1: Given an observed vector, calculate the probabilities associated with every possible 
true vector.  
Denote the observed and a true vector by Observed and True, respectively. The 
conditional probability is 
)(P
)(P)|(P
)|(P
Observed
TrueTrueObserved
ObservedTrue

 .          (3) 
where r is the index over all true vectors. If the number of possible true vectors is large, we 
can assume 
)(P)(P iTrueiTrue , 
where Truei represents the value for attribute i in the True vector. Similar to the well-known 
naïve Bayes method, we adopt two other assumptions:  
)P()P( Π TrueTrueObserved |Observed| ii  for all i, and 
)|(P)|(P iii TrueObservedObserved True  for all i. 
Then,  
)|(P)(P ii TrueObservediTrue|Observed .                      (4) 
Finally, )P(Observed can be calculated based on the law of total probability, i.e., 
)()PP()P( r
r
r| TrueTrueObservedObserved  ,           (5) 
where r is the index over all possible true vectors. 
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Note that in calculating the conditional probabilities, we need to use the distortion 
matrices and marginal distributions for liars, as illustrated in Figures 2.3(a) and 2.4(a). 
 
Step 2: Find the Liar Table recommendation. 
Use the True Tree to obtain the recommendation for every true vector. Add the 
conditional probabilities associated with all true vectors that have the same recommendation. 
The recommendation with the highest total probability is selected as the Liar Table 
recommendation for the Observed vector, because this recommendation is most likely to be 
the accurate one for a user with the Observed vector. 
 
Step 3: Generate and Condense the Liar Table.  
Repeat Step 1 and Step 2 for all possible observed vectors to generate the fully 
enumerated Liar Table. In the full Liar Table, sometimes the value of a given attribute does 
not affect the recommendation. Therefore, we can collapse each set of “redundant” decision 
rules into a single row, similar to those shown in Table 2.1. Once all such redundancies are 
removed, we obtain a condensed Liar Table. 
 
Step 4: Build the Liar Tree from the condensed Liar Table.  
The heuristic used to build the True Tree can be used to construct the Liar Tree (or 
LT for short).  
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Following steps 1-4, and using data shown in Figures 2.2-2.4, we obtain a Liar Tree 
for the credit risk assessment example. The complete Split Tree is shown in Figure 2.6. For 
better clarity, the True Tree structure is not included in the figure. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Complete Split Tree 
 
2.2.4. Consolidated Tree Method (CT) 
With the ST method, the VA is always verified before deciding which tree branch to 
traverse. After additional analysis, we find that under certain situations, the true value of the 
VA does not affect the recommendation. Motivated by this observation, we develop an 
alternative method to deal with users’ input distortion. With this new method, the true value 
of the VA is simply treated as a “separate” attribute in the decision table. Therefore, each 
vector in the expanded decision includes the observed values of all attributes as well as the 
true value of the VA. The best recommendation for this vector is one with the highest 
probability of being correct given the available information. The expanded decision table (or 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
Income 
     Employed Employed 
 
P (liar | BO=Bankruptcy, BT=Bankruptcy truth) < Threshold 
True  
Tree 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
yes 
yes 
 
no 
 
no 
 
no 
 
no 
 
MR 
LR 
LR MR 
MR 
MR
MR 
LR
LR 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
yes 
 
no 
 
HR 
low 
medium 
high 
yes no 
no 
Bankruptcy 
HR 
yes 
 
no 
 
Bankruptcy 
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the CT Table) is then condensed and transformed into a single tree. We call this method 
Consolidated Tree (or CT) method because there are no separate tree branches for liars and 
truth-tellers under this method. We next explain in detail how the Consolidated Tree can be 
constructed.  
 
For each vector in the CT Table, repeat Steps 1-4 to obtain its CT recommendation: 
Step 1. Find the probability that the user with the given vector is a liar. 
Since the given vector includes both the observed value and the true value of the VA, 
the probability that the user is a liar or a truth-teller can be calculated based on formulas (1) 
and (2). We denote these probabilities by P(liar | VA
O
, VA
T
) and P(truth-teller | VA
O
, VA
T
), 
respectively. 
 
Step 2. Calculate LT path probability associated with each possible recommendation.  
Since there is one Consolidated Tree, we need to consider the probability that a user 
is liar as well as the probability that she is a truth-teller. If the user is a liar, then similar to 
Step 1 in building the Liar Tree, we calculate the conditional probabilities associated with all 
possible true vectors and then sum up the conditional probabilities of all true vectors that 
have the same recommendation. Using the credit risk assessment example, we denote the 
total conditional probabilities associated with low-risk, medium risk, and high-risk by P(LR), 
P(MR), and P(HR), respectively. Since these probabilities are relevant only if the user is a 
liar, we need to multiply each of them by P(liar| VA
O
, VA
T
) and obtain P(liar | VA
O
, 
VA
T
)*P(LR) , P(liar | VA
O
, VA
T
)*P(MR), and P(liar | VA
O
, VA
T
)*P(HR). Each of these 
probabilities is referred to as LT path probability associated with a recommendation.  
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Step 3. Calculate the TT path probability.  
If P(truth-teller | VA
O
, VA
T
) > 0, feed the observed values into the True Tree, and 
obtain the True recommendation. Since there is no uncertainty in the Truth Tree path, we set 
the TT path probability associated with the True recommendation as P(truth-teller | VA
O
, VA
T
) 
and that associated with all other recommendations as zero.  
 
Step 4. Obtain the CT recommendation for the given vector.  
Add the LT path probabilities and the TT path probabilities for the same 
recommendations. The recommendation with the highest probability sum is selected as the 
CT recommendation for the given vector. For instance, if the True recommendation is MR 
for the credit risk assessment example, then we need to compare P(liar | VA
O
, VA
T
)* P(MR) + 
P(truth-teller | VA
O
, VA
T
) with P(liar | VA
O
, VA
T
) * P(LR) and P(liar | VA
O
, VA
T
) * P(HR). The 
recommendation with the highest probability is selected as the CT recommendation. 
 
Step 5: Repeat Steps 1 – 4 for all possible vectors to generate the fully enumerated CT Table.  
 
Step 6: Condense the CT Table and transform it into a CT Tree.  
 
Following the CT method, the condensed table for the credit assessment example is 
shown in Table 2.2. Note that “Bankruptcy Truth” is treated as the fifth attribute in the table. 
The “-” symbol in the fifth column implies that whether the true Bankruptcy value is true or 
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not does not affect the recommendations produced by the CT method, hence the attribute 
need not be verified. This is an important advantage of the CT method over the ST method.  
 
From the CT Table, we obtain the corresponding Consolidated Tree, as shown in 
Figure 2.7. By comparing the Split Tree shown in Figure 2.6 and the Consolidated Tree 
shown in this figure, we find that these two methods do not always lead to the same 
recommendation. Furthermore, this Consolidated Tree shows that a users’ true Bankruptcy 
value does not need to be verified in every branch. This can lead to significant cost savings 
because verifying the true values of a VA takes time and incurs costs. Therefore, the CT 
method is more efficient than the ST method. We also expect the CT method to have a better 
accuracy than the ST method because when the CT Tree is built, we maximize the accuracy 
of recommendation by taking into consideration all possible paths and their associated 
probabilities. 
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Table 2.2 Condensed Table for Consolidated Tree Method 
Income 
Bachelor's 
Degree 
Employme
nt 
Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy 
Truth 
Classificati
on 
H - - - - LR 
M Y Y - - LR 
M N Y - - MR 
M - N - - MR 
L - - Y Y HR 
L - N Y N HR 
L Y Y Y N MR 
L N Y Y N HR 
L Y - N N MR 
L Y Y N Y LR 
L Y N N Y MR 
L N Y N - MR 
L N N N Y MR 
L N N N N LR 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Consolidated Tree 
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2.3. Value-Based Method 
The ST and CT methods proposed in Section 2.2 attempt to maximize the accuracy of 
recommendations. An implicitly assumption made in the two methods is that the 
misclassification cost remains the same for all misclassification scenarios. In the real-world, 
this may not be the case. For instance, incorrectly classifying a low-risk customer as a high 
risk one may lead to the denial of loan and hence the loss of opportunity to earn interests 
from the customer. On the other hand, misclassifying a high risk customer as a low-risk one 
may lead to default. The second scenario can potentially be much more costly than the first 
scenario. In this section, we extend the two methods developed in the previous section to the 
corresponding value-based methods: Value-based Split Tree (VST) and Value-based 
Consolidated Tree (VCT). The main difference between the accuracy-based methods (ST and 
CT) and the value-based methods (VST and VCT) is that the former attempts to maximize 
the accuracy of recommendations, while the later makes recommendations that lead to the 
lowest misclassification costs.  
 
In order to use the value-based methods, we need to know the misclassification costs 
under different scenarios. For convenience of exposition, we first construct the 
misclassification cost matrix. In a misclassification cost matrix, the columns represent the 
true class, and the rows represent the recommended class. Figure 2.8 shows a hypothetical 
matrix for the credit risk assessment example. In this matrix, the entry “20” means that the 
cost of misclassifying a low-risk customer as a high-risk one is 20. In the real world, 
misclassification costs can be estimated by domain experts or from historical data. For 
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instance, financial institutions often collect data regarding loan default rates from customers 
at different risk levels.
1
 Such data could be used to construct the misclassification cost matrix 
for a credit risk assessment application. 
 
 
LR MR HR 
LR 0 45 100 
MR 10 0 50 
HR 20 28 0 
 
Figure 2.8 Misclassification Costs Matrix 
 
2.3.1. Value-Based Split Tree Method (VST) 
The input of VST is similar to that of ST method, except that VST takes into 
consideration the misclassification costs when deciding the best recommendations. 
Specifically, the method traverses the True Tree branch recommendation when the 
probability of liar is below a threshold. Otherwise, it traverses the Value-based Liar Tree 
branch. The difference between Value-based Liar Tree and Liar Tree is that the former is 
constructed based on recommendations that minimize the misclassification costs instead of 
maximizing the probability of being accurate.  
 
In terms of the actual procedure, ST and VST differ only in Step 2 that generates the 
(Value-based) Liar Table recommendations. In Step 2 of the ST method, we add the 
conditional probabilities associated with the same recommendations and select the 
recommendation with the highest probability sum. In Step 2 of the VST method, we first 
                                                 
 
1 An example of such data is available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_card_interest. 
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obtain the same probability sums for all possible recommendations, then calculate the 
misclassification costs under different scenarios, and finally select the recommendation that 
minimizes the expected total misclassification cost.  
 
Formally, let GR denote the generated recommendation and AR the accurate 
recommendation. The recommendation with the lowest misclassification cost can be obtained 
by 
 
l
llqq
GR
ARARGRCGRC
q
)P()|(=)( argmin ,            (5) 
where l is the index over all possible accurate recommendations, q is the index over all 
possible generated recommendations, P(AR
l
) is the same probability sum associated with AR
l
 
obtained in Step 2 of the ST method, and C(GR
q
|AR
l
) is the misclassification cost and can be 
found from the misclassification cost matrix.  
 
Figure 2.9 shows the Value-based Split Tree built for the credit risk assessment 
example. Similar to the ST method, the VST method produces a tree structure that includes a 
True Tree branch and a Valued-based Liar Tree branch. Once again, the branch traversed at 
the time of consulting depends on whether the probability that a user is a liar is above or 
below the given threshold.  
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Figure 2.9 Value-Based Split Tree 
 
2.3.2. Value-Based Consolidated Tree Method (VCT) 
Analogous to the extension from ST to VST, we now extend the accuracy-based CT 
method to produce a Value-based Consolidated Tree (VCT) that minimizes the expected total 
misclassification cost.  
 
Similar to the difference between ST to VST, the procedures for CT and VCT differ 
only in the step that selects the CT (VCT) recommendations. Specifically, in Step 4 of the CT 
method, we add LT and TT path probabilities for every recommendation and then select the 
recommendation with the highest probability sum as the CT recommendation. In Step 4 of 
the VCT method, we still calculate the sum of the LT and TT path probabilities associated 
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with every recommendation. Once the probability sums are obtained, we can use again use 
formula (5) to obtain the expected total misclassification cost C(GR
q
) associated with each 
recommendation GR
q
, and then select the recommendation with the lowest total 
misclassification cost as the VCT recommendation.  
 
The final output of VCT method is Value-based Consolidated Tree. Figure 2.10 
illustrates such a tree for the credit risk assessment example. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Value-Based Consolidated Tree 
 
2.3.3. Comparison 
As explained earlier, the Split Tree methods always require the verification of the true 
value of the VA, whereas the Consolidated Tree methods may need to verify VA only for 
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certain cases. The VST and VCT trees shown in Figures 2.9 and 2.10 again confirm this 
important difference.  
 
Furthermore, the differences between Figures 2.6 and 2.9 or those between Figures 
2.7 and 2.10 show that the most accurate recommendation is not always the one that 
minimizes the misclassification cost, implying that pursuing a higher accuracy does not 
guarantee a lower cost. This shows that the value-based methods are indeed necessary, 
especially when the misclassification costs demonstrate a high degree of asymmetry under 
different error scenarios.  
 
2.4. Experiments for Performance Evaluation 
We conduct a series of experiments to evaluate the performances of the proposed 
methods against existing methods. The first set of experiments is based on a dataset for a 
real-world credit approval application downloaded from the UC Irvine machine learning 
repository (http://www.ics.uci.edu/~mlearn/MLRepository.html). Similar to the procedure 
adopted by Jiang et al. (2005), we preprocess the dataset to obtain a fully enumerated 
decision table that includes 15 binary attributes, and treat this table as the True Table for the 
entire population. From this True Table, we build the corresponding True Tree (TT). Given 
the True Tree, we can evaluate the performances of different methods.  
 
2.4.1. Experiment Procedure  
We first describe the experiment procedure for a fixed True Tree and a fixed set of 
parameter values, followed by the complete procedure that varies some of the parameter 
values. Additional experiments for robustness testing will be described in Subsection 2.4.4. 
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2.4.1.1. The Basic Procedure.  
The basic experiment procedure for a True Tree is as follows: 
Step 1. Obtain the underlying parameter values:  
We first generate the true parameters for the underlying user population, including 
the percentage of liars, the liars’ distortion matrices, the marginal distributions of the 
attributes for liars and truth-tellers. We then generate a random sample of users based on 
these parameter values. The sample of users is subsequently used to obtain the estimated 
distributions and distortion matrices. 
 
Step 2. Generate KM Tree:  
The KM Tree is constructed for comparison with the methods proposed in the present 
study. Since the KM method does not differentiate liars from truth-tellers, we construct the 
KM Tree using the marginal distributions and distortion matrixes for the entire population, 
similar to those illustrated in Figure 2.3(c) and 2.4(c). 
 
Step 3. Generate ST, CT, VST, and VCT Trees:  
Select an attribute as the verifiable attribute (VA). Following the procedures 
described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we construct the ST, CT, VST, and VCT trees.  
 
Step 4. Simulate User’s True and Observed Input Vectors:  
Based on the marginal distribution of each attribute, we randomly generate a true 
input vector for each simulated user. This input vector is then fed into the True Tree to obtain 
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the true recommendation, which is used to decide the accuracy of other recommendations. 
Then, based on the percentage of liars in the population, we randomly determine whether the 
user is a liar or not. If the user is determined to be a truth-teller, her observed input vector is 
the same as her input vector. In case the user is a liar, her observed input values are distorted 
based on the assumed distortion matrices for liars.  
 
 
Step 5. Calculate Accuracy and Misclassification Cost:  
Feed each user’s observed input vector into the True Tree, KM Tree, ST Tree, CT 
Tree, VST Tree, and VCT Tree to obtain their respective recommendations. Compare the 
recommendation obtained by each method with the true recommendation. If they are the 
same, the recommendation is considered correct, otherwise it is incorrect. For each incorrect 
recommendation, the corresponding misclassification cost is calculated based on the 
misclassification matrix illustrated in Figure 2.8. 
 
Step 6. Compare Accuracy and Misclassification Cost:  
Repeat steps (4) and (5) 10,000 times to simulate 10,000 users. Record the total 
number of correct recommendations and the total misclassification cost associated with each 
method. Compare the accuracies, i.e., the percentages of correct recommendations, and 
misclassification costs of different methods.  
 
2.4.1.2. The Complete Procedure.  
The basic experiment procedure uses a fix set of population parameter values, 
including the liar percentage and distortion matrices. To evaluate the performance of the 
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different methods under varying severity of lying, we control two important parameters in an 
extended set of experiments, i.e., liar percentage and distortion level for liars. The distortion 
level for an attribute measures the probability that the attribute’s value will be distorted by 
liars, and is calculated based on the marginal distribution and distortion matrix for liars. The 
distortion levels are kept the same for all attributes in our experiments.  
 
In these experiments, we try 11 different liar percentages varying from 0% to 100% 
and 9 different levels of distortion from 0.1 to 0.9. In addition, we randomly choose one 
attribute as the verifiable attribute (VA) during the expanded procedure. For a given 
combination of liar percentage and distortion level, we perform the basic procedure shown in 
subsection 2.4.1.1 to compare the performances of the different methods.  
 
2.4.2. Experimental Results  
Based on the data collected from the experiments, we calculate the average accuracy 
and the total misclassification cost of each method. The results are summarized in Table 2.3. 
As shown in the table, the CT method achieves an average accuracy of 73.2%, the highest 
among all the methods. The ST method places second, followed by TT (True Tree), VCT, 
KM, and VST. Regarding the misclassification cost, the VCT has the least overall 
misclassification cost at $56,953 for 10,000 simulated users. The VST ranks the second, and 
then CT, ST, TT, and KM. 
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Table 2.3 Performance Comparison Among Methods 
Method TT KM ST CT VST VCT 
Accuracy (%) 69.5% 69.1% 72.3% 73.2% 68.4% 69.3% 
Misclassification Cost 87,122 90,011 79,846 76,882 59,277 56.953 
 
 
To better understand how the performances of the different methods are affected by 
the severity of the users’ lying behaviors, we plot their performances against two controlled 
parameters in the experiments, i.e., the liar percentage and the distortion level.  
 
2.4.2.1. Liar Percentage 
Figures 2.11(a) and 2.11(b) show the impact of liar percentage on accuracy under two 
distortion levels (50% and 70%, respectively). We find that CT always performs better than 
ST, KM, TT, VCT, and VST. When the percentage of liar is zero or 10%, CT, ST, VCT, and 
VST have the same accuracy. Their performance differences start to widen as the liar 
percentage increases. As the liar percentage approaches 100%, however, the performance 
differences between CT, ST, and KM again narrows. When the liar percentage is 100%, the 
three methods have exactly the same accuracy, since both ST and CT rely completely on the 
Liar Tree, which is the same as KM Tree under this condition. Similarly, VCT and VST have 
the same accuracy when liar percentage is 100% because they both provide the same 
recommendations as Value-based Liar Tree.  
 
A surprising result observed from the two figures is that the True Tree can outperform 
the KM Tree when the liar percentage is not high. The advantage of True Tree over KM is 
more significant when distortion level is between 30% and 80% (Figure 2.11 (b)). This is a 
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result not observed in the study that develops the KM method (Jiang et al. 2005). We will 
further examine this interesting phenomenon in Subsection 2.4.3.  
 
      
 
Figure 2.11 Impact of Liar Percentage on Accuracy 
 
Figure 2.12(a) and 2.12(b) show the impact of liar percentage on the total 
misclassification costs at two distortion levels (0.5 and 0.7 respectively). We can see that the 
value-based methods lead to significantly lower misclassification costs than the other 
methods. Between the two value-based methods, VCT always performs better than or as well 
as VST in lowering the misclassification costs. The difference is smaller when the liar 
percentage is close to 100% or 0%. Regarding the other methods, we find that the cost-based 
performance ordering closely follows the accuracy ordering. For instance, CT has a relatively 
lower misclassification cost compared to ST, KM, and TT, and KM can lead to a higher 
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misclassification cost than TT unless the liar percentage is above 80%. In both cases, the 
lower (higher) misclassification cost is the result of a higher (lower) accuracy of 
recommendations. 
 
       
 
Figure 2.12 Impact of Liar Percentage on Misclassification Cost 
 
2.4.2.2. Distortion Level 
We next examine the impact of input distortion on the performances of the different 
methods. Figure 2.13(a) and 2.13(b) show its impact on accuracy under two liar percentages 
(50% and 70% respectively). We can see that CT still performs the best among all compared 
methods. When distortion level is very low (e.g., 0.1) or very high (e.g., 0.9), the 
performance difference between CT and ST narrows. Figures 13(a) and 13(b) also show that 
the True Tree (TT) has a clear advantage over KM unless the distortion level is low. At a 
higher distortion level, the KM can lead a worse accuracy than all other methods. Since the 
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two figures show the performances at a liar percentage of 50% and 70%, respectively, the 
results are consistent with the previous observation that the KM method does not perform 
well when the liar percentage is 80% or lower. 
 
Further, by comparing Figure 2.13 with Figure 2.11 , we observe that the accuracies 
of the four methods proposed in this research, i.e., CT, ST, VCT and VST, generally decrease 
with the liar percentage, while they first decrease and then increase as the distortion level 
changes from very low (e.g., 0.1) to very high (e.g., 0.9). This is because when the distortion 
level is close to 1.0, there could be less than uncertainly about the true values. For instance, 
given a binary attribute with a distortion level of 0.9, then just choosing the value other than 
the observed value can lead to a 90% accuracy. The four proposed methods are sufficiently 
intelligent to incorporate this factor, hence their accuracies can improve as the distortion 
level is getting close to 1.0. 
     
 
Figure 2.13 Impact of Distortion on Accuracy 
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The impact of the distortion level on the misclassification costs of the compared 
methods is shown in Figure 2.14 (a) and 2.14(b), corresponding to two fixed liar percentages 
at 50% and 70%, respectively. Again, VCT always has the lowest misclassification cost and 
VST places second. The performances of the accuracy-based methods again correlate with 
the accuracies of their recommendations, with CT performing better consistently better than 
ST. The KM method, again performs the worst when the distortion level is high. 
 
       
 
Figure 2.14 Impact of Distortion on Misclassification Cost 
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both liars and truth-tellers. Note that KM does not differentiate liars from truth-tellers. 
Instead, it estimates the distortion matrices and marginal distributions based on the data for 
the entire population. In essence, the KM method assumes that all users may lie and the 
probability of lying about each attribute is the same across users.  
 
In reality, there are users who tend to lie and users who rarely or never lie. We can 
illustrate this composition by Figure 2.15. There are two groups of users in a population. The 
first group accounts for 20% of the population and they lie 100% of the time. The second 
group accounts for 80% of the population and all of them are truth-tellers. When the two 
groups are mixed together, the liar percentage for the entire population is 20%. Now, if the 
True Tree is adopted for this particular population, although the recommendations for the 
liars may have a low accuracy, the recommendations for all truth-tellers are guaranteed to be 
correct. Because the truth-tellers account for 80% of the population, the average accuracy for 
True Tree will be at least 80%. On the other hand, when the KM Tree is adopted, since it 
assumes that everyone is a liar, the recommendations for truth-tellers may not be correct. 
Even the recommendations for liars may not have a high accuracy because the distortion 
matrices used by the KM, which is calculated for the entire population, are very different 
from those for the liars. As a result, the accuracy of KM may suffer. Therefore, the True Tree 
can outperform the KM Tree under this scenario. 
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Based on the user composition illustrated in Figure 2.15, we can imagine that when 
the percentage of liars in the population is high, the distortion matrices for the entire 
population, which are used by KM, will become similar to those for liars. Then, the 
performance of KM should improve. This is confirmed by Figure 2.11, which shows that the 
liar percentage is above 80%, the KM Tree clearly outperforms the True Tree, and it even 
matches the CT method when the liar percentage is close to 100%. 
 
Based on experiment results and the analysis following Figure 2.15, we conclude that 
the KM method is recommended only if the user population is relatively homogeneous and 
the majority of them tend to lie. When there is a clear separation of truth-tellers and liars in 
the population and liars only account for a relatively small percentage of the population, the 
methods proposed in this study, CT and VCT in particular, should be used. 
 
     
 
Figure 2.15 Mixing Liars and Truth-Tellers 
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2.4.4. Robustness Tests 
We conduct additional simulated experiments to evaluate the robustness of the 
proposed methods and examine whether the findings presented in Subsection 2.4.2 remain 
valid under different conditions. 
 
2.4.4.1. Test on Different VAs.  
In order to assess whether the selection of verifiable attributes (VAs) affects the 
performances of the proposed methods, we run some additional tests. With a fixed True Tree, 
we change the VA in each run, and record the performances of the proposed methods under 
different conditions. We find that there is no dramatic change in performances as the selected 
VA changes, and the findings presented in Subsection 2.4.2 remain valid qualitatively.  
 
 
2.4.4.2. Test on Multiple VAs. 
 An intuitive extension of the proposed methods is to utilize multiple VAs to estimate 
the probability of a user being a liar. In additional experiments, we try two and three VAs on 
the ST and CT methods. For expositional convenience, we label the Double-VA extensions 
of ST and CT by DST and DST, and their Triple-VA extensions by TST and TCT, 
respectively. Figure 2.16 shows the how the performances of the different methods change 
with the liar percentage and distortion level. The average accuracies for ST, CT, DST, DCT, 
TST, and TCT are found to be 72.53%, 73.54%, 73.79% , 74.34%, 74.39% and 74.74%, 
respectively. These figures show that including more VAs slightly increases the accuracy, 
and the CT-based methods consistently outperform the ST-based methods. Our t-tests 
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confirm that the difference between ST-based and CT-based methods is significant regardless 
of the number of VAs used.  
 
     
 
Figure 2.16 Multiple Verified Attributes Affect Accuracy 
 
2.4.4.3. Test on Distortion Matrices.  
We are also interested in evaluating whether the characteristics of the distortion 
matrices affect the performances of the compared methods. For this purpose, we adopt the 
Kullback–Leibler divergence (Kullback and Leibler 1951) to measure the degree of 
difference between two distortion matrices. The formula for this measure is 

i iQ
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ln)()||(KL               (6) 
where P, Q are two matrixes and DKL(P||Q) is the K-L divergence of Q from P. We select 
identity matrix as the benchmark matrix P. For each distortion matrix, we calculate its K-L 
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divergence of each distortion matrix and the corresponding performances including both 
accuracy and misclassification cost. The results do not suggest a significant correlation 
between the Kullback–Leibler divergence and the performances of different methods.  
 
2.4.4.4. Additional Tests based on Simulated Trees.  
To further assess the performances of the different methods under different 
environments, in addition to the experiments based on the decision tree generated from the 
real-world credit approval dataset, we repeat a large number of experiments based on 
simulated decision trees. Specifically, similar to the decision tree for real-world credit 
approval application, we simulate 17 other true decision tables with 15 binary attributes. In 
addition, we simulated 100 true decision tables based on the credit risk assessment example 
shown in Table 1. In each of these tables, the recommendation corresponding to each input 
vector is randomly generated. 
 
Similar to the experiments reported in Subsection 2.4.2, for each of the simulated True 
Trees, we again try 11 different liar percentages and 9 different distortion levels. After 
analyzing the experiment results, we conclude that the findings from these simulated 
experiments are largely consistent with the findings reported Subsections 2.4.2. 
 
2.4.5. Summary 
Based on the large number of experiments, we conclude that the four methods 
proposed in this study are superior to existing methods when users in the underlying 
population have varying degrees of tendency to lie. Among the four proposed methods, the 
Consolidated Tree methods (i.e., CT and VCT) are shown to outperform the Split Tree 
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methods (i.e., ST and VST) because CT and VCT are not only more accurate, but also lead to 
lower cost. Therefore, depending on whether the goal is to maximize accuracy or minimize 
the misclassification cost, either CT or VCT should be the method of choice for addressing 
the challenge of input distortion for deductive expert systems. 
 
2.5. Selection of VAs 
In this section, we discuss several practical issues related to the selection of verifiable 
attributes (VAs) to support the four methods proposed in this study (i.e., ST, CT, VST, VCT). 
 
2.5.1. Determining the Best VA or VA Group 
As shown in Section 2.4, the proposed methods outperform existing methods and can 
lead to significant benefits. Additional experiments reported in Subsection 2.4.4.2 
demonstrate that performances of the methods can be further improved when multiple VAs 
are used. However, verifying the true values of a VA is not cost-free. Some attributes are less 
costly to verify than others. In the credit risk assessment example, for instance, verifying a 
user’s bankruptcy status could be much less costly than verifying her income. When a group 
of VAs instead of a single VA is selected, although the method performances can be further 
improved, the verification costs will also increase.  
 
Therefore, when deciding which attribute(s) to select as VA(s), we need to balance 
the benefit resulting from the reduction in misclassification costs (we can assume that the 
accuracy-based methods have a cost matrix with “0” on the diagonal and “1” elsewhere) and 
the costs of verifying the selected attributes. The attribute or group of attributes that leads to 
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the highest net benefit, which equals the expected gross benefit minus the cost of verification, 
should be selected as the VA(s) for the proposed methods. Since the gross benefit equals the 
reduction in misclassification cost, this is equivalent to selecting the attribute(s) that 
minimize the sum of misclassification cost and verification cost. We next discuss how the 
two costs can be computed. 
 
The cost of verification for each selected VA or VA group equals the cost of one 
verification times the probability that the VA(s) will need to be verified at the time of 
consultation (recall that under CT or VCT, sometimes it is not necessary to verify the true 
values of VAs). The probability can be obtained by summing up the probabilities associated 
with all branches of a tree (e.g., a VCT Tree) that require the true values of the VA(s). In the 
credit risk assessment example, suppose the cost of verifying a user’s Bankruptcy status is 
$20, and that of verifying Education is $45. When Bankruptcy is selected as the VA, the 
probability that it needs to be verified in the VCT true is 0.35. When Education is selected as 
the VA, the probability that it has to be verified is 0.41. Then, the expected costs of 
verification for the two attributes are 
7.00,0.35*20  cy)(Brankrupt VC  and 
.45.810.41*45  )(Education VC  
 
The misclassification cost associated with each selected VA or VA group can be 
assessed based on either simulated or real performance evaluation. In either case, we need to 
obtain a mis-recommendation matrix for each selected VA(s), which shows how objects with 
a given true classification are misclassified into other classifications. In the credit risk 
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assessment example, for instance, the matrix should record the percentages of “low risk” 
customers that are incorrectly classified as “high risk” and “medium risk” by a proposed 
method. Once such mis-recommendation matrix is obtained, we can use it, along with the 
misclassification cost matrix and the marginal distribution of true classifications, to 
determine the expected cost of mis-recommendations corresponding to each selected VA(s). 
 
 HR MR LR 
HR 85% 14% 1% 
MR 23% 71% 6% 
LR 39% 18% 43% 
 
 HR MR LR 
HR 87% 9% 4% 
MR 22% 73% 5% 
LR 31% 6% 63% 
 
 
Figure 2.17(a) Mis-Recommendation Matrix 
Corresponding to Bankruptcy 
 
Figure 2.17(b) Mis-Recommendation Matrix 
Corresponding to Education 
 
To illustrate, suppose the mis-recommendation matrices corresponding to the two VA 
options are shown in Figures 2.17(a) and 2.17(b), respectively. The misclassification cost 
matrix is the same as the one shown in Figure 2.8. The marginal probabilities associated with 
“HR,” “MR,” and “LR,” are 0.1, 0.3, 0.6, respectively. The misrepresentation costs are 
calculated as 
and  ,024.100.6*18%)*28+39%*(20+                                 
0.3*6%)*50+23%*(10+0.1*1%)*100+14%*(45  cy)(Brankrupt

MRC
 
.943.60.6*6%)*28+31%*(20+                              
0.3*5%)*50+22%*(10+0.1*4%)*100+9%*(45  )(Education

MRC
 
Therefore, the total costs associated with the two VAs are  
,024.17cy)(Brankruptcy)(Brankrupt  cy)(Brankrupt  MRVT CCC  and 
.393.25)(Education)(Education  )(Education  MRVT CCC  
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Based on this result, Bankruptcy is a better option than Education as VA. Similarly, 
the costs associated with other feasible VA(s) can be computed. The VA(s) with the lowest 
total cost should be selected. 
 
2.5.2. Selecting an External VA 
In some cases, it may be very difficult or costly to verify any of the internal attributes, 
i.e., those included in the True Tree. As an alternative, we could use an external attribute, 
one that is not included in the True Tree but easier to verify, to estimate the probability that a 
user is liar. For instance, in the credit risk assessment example, a user’s Citizenship status is 
not included in the True Tree. We next illustrate this attribute can be used as an external VA 
to help implement the VCT method. 
 
Citizenship has two possible values (Yes, No). Similar to interval attributes, we can 
obtain the distortion matrices and marginal distributions for this external VA, as illustrated in 
Figures 18(a) and 18(b). Based on these distortion matrices and marginal distributions, once 
a user’s observed and true Citizenship status is known, we can calculate the probability that a 
user is a liar or not. Analogous to the basic steps for the VCT method, we can built an 
extended VCT Table with the observed and true values of Citizenship included, and then 
construct an extended VCT Tree from this table. Similarly, the other three proposed methods 
can also be extended to include the external VA. 
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                              Citizenship (C) for Liars 
 Yes  No 
Yes 0.39 0.61 
No 0.17 0.83 
 
 Citizenship (C) for Truth-Teller 
 Yes No 
Yes 1.00 0.00 
No 0.00 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2.18(a) Distortion Matrices for the External Verified Attribute 
 
Figure 2.18(b) Marginal Distribution for the External Verified Attribute 
 
 
Using external VAs does not affect the proposed methods in the same manner.  For 
Split Trees, the tree structure is not much affected since the VA is always first verified 
regardless of whether it is an internal one or not. For Consolidated Trees, since the observed 
and true values for an external VA are treated as two additional attributes in the extended 
decision table, the tree structure changes.  
 
 
    Citizenship (C) for Liars 
Yes 0.52 
No 0.48 
 
Citizenship (C) for Truth-Teller 
Yes 0.6 
No 0.4 
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Figure 2.19 Consolidated Tree with External Verified Attribute 
 
With Citizenship as an external VA, and using values shown in Figures 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 
and 2.18, we obtain a Consolidated Tree for the credit risk assessment example, as shown in 
Figure 2.19. Compared to Figure 2.7, this tree changes dramatically with more nodes and 
layers. Note that in certain branches, we do not need to verify the value of the external VA, 
which is consistent with CT Trees built using internals VAs.  
 
Still with Citizenship as an external VA, we build other trees and run performance 
evaluations. Figure 2.20 shows the how the performances of the different methods change 
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with the liar percentage and distortion level. The average accuracies for TT, KM, ST, CT, 
VST, and VCT are found to be 71.89%, 71.43%, 73.88% , 74.88%, 69.54% and 70.62%, 
respectively. The results and the figures show that the performance comparison across 
methods is largely consistent with the results obtained when internal VAs are used.  
 
   
 
Figure 2.20 External Verified Attributes Affect Accuracy 
 
The fact that an external VA can be as effective as internal VAs brings more options 
when selecting the VAs for the proposed methods. It is even possible that a combination of 
internal and external attributes can be adopted. The wider set of choices can lower the barrier 
for implementing the proposed methods and potentially reduce the verification cost by a 
substantial amount. 
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2.5.3. Dealing with Strategic Agents 
Once the proposed method (e.g., VCT) deployed, it is possible that after repeat tries, a 
strategic agent or groups of such agents can find out which attribute is used as a VA. 
Subsequently, they could try to “defeat” the system by providing true values to the VA, but 
lying about other attributes. There are a number of countermeasures to deal with such 
strategic behavior. The first option is to change the VA from time to time. The second one is 
to randomize the selection of VAs at runtime. We have built and tested such variation 
methods and found that the performance comparisons of the different methods remain largely 
unchanged from the cases with fixed VAs.  
 
2.6. Discussions and Future Research Directions 
Despite the prevalence of input distortion by users of expert systems, research on how 
to effectively address such challenges has been limited. The methods proposed in this study 
explicitly differentiate liars from truth-tellers and treat them differently when their 
information is provided to redesign deductive expert systems. Two of the proposed methods, 
i.e., Split Tree (ST) and Consolidated Tree (CT), attempt to improve the accuracy of 
recommendations, and the other two, i.e., Value-based Split Tree (VST) and Value-based 
Consolidated Tree (VCT), aim to minimize the expected misclassification cost resulting from 
incorrect recommendations. Experimental results show that the proposed methods can lead to 
significantly better accuracy or lower cost than existing methods. Between the two pairs of 
proposed method, we find that CT consistently outperforms ST in improving the accuracy of 
recommendations, and VCT always performs better than VST in reducing the expected 
misclassification cost. In addition, we find that the KM method proposed by Jiang et al. 
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(2005), which essentially assumes that all users are potentially liars and treats them in the 
same manner, is not effective when there is a clear separation of liars and truth-tellers in the 
underlying population, a finding that further confirms the necessity of differentiating liars 
from truth-tellers when addressing input distortion by users.  
 
The methodologies and findings of this study have important financial implications. 
Although the proposed methods require the verification of user-provided attribute values, the 
cost of such validation can be controlled by selecting the attributes that are relatively easy to 
verify. As a result, the expected benefit of adopting the proposed methods should exceed the 
expected cost under most real-world applications. Given the wide application of expert 
systems in various problem domains, the proposed methods can potentially lead to significant 
financial saving for organizations. Furthermore, providing both accuracy-based and value-
based methods gives firms the flexibility to select the appropriate method based on the 
underlying misclassification cost structure. Specifically, when the misclassification cost 
matrix is asymmetric, the VCT method is most preferred. When the misclassification cost 
matrix is approximately symmetric or the misclassification costs are very difficult to estimate, 
the simpler CT method should be adopted.  
 
The methods we propose in this study can be extended in future research to address 
more complex problem scenarios. For instance, in this study we consider only two groups of 
potential users, i.e., liars and truth-tellers. Such two-group model may not be sufficient to 
capture the heterogeneity among potential users. For instance, some users never lie, some 
may lie occasionally, while others who lie frequently. How to extend our model to 
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incorporate multiple groups of users is an interesting direction for further research. 
Furthermore, the proposed methods are computationally intensive, hence they may become 
impractical when the number of attributes or the number of states for the attributes are large. 
In a future study, one could simplify the methods to reduce their complexity. For instance, 
when computing the CT Table, it is possible that the accuracy may not degrade much even if 
we consider only a small subset of the possible true vectors given an observed vector. The 
computation time can be significantly reduced if a subset of vectors can be identified and 
used in constructing the trees.  
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CHAPTER 3. DEVELOP PROFITABLE RECOMMENDATION SYSTEMS WITH 
SHILLING ATTACK DETECTION 
 
3.1. Introduction 
With the significant advances in web technology, there has been explosive growth of 
electronic transactions.  A flood of product information including consumer reviews or 
ratings are now available on the Internet.  Consumers nowadays have various and easy access 
to different products through online searches. This type of information overloading has 
presented great challenges to the customers. Asch (1961) found that when customers selected 
the items for the first time, they would tend to rely on other customers’ opinions. 
Accordingly, recommendation systems have been designed to help customers to identify their 
favorable items. The rationale behind an important technique (e.g. collaborative filtering) 
commonly used in recommendation systems is that customers who share similar tastes in the 
past tend to have similar tastes in the future. For a particular customer (the active user), 
collaborative filtering recommendation systems will select a list of users who share the 
similar preference with the active user. The selected users are called neighbors and the 
predicted preference of the active user is based on the ratings of their neighbors. Hence, 
many electronic retailers (e-retailers) such as Amazon and Netflix have attempted to harvest 
this big data through recommendation systems by predicting users’ preferences through 
business analytics based on users’ neighborhood selection, opinions collections, etc. 
(Herlocker et al. 1999; Huang et al. 2007; Lam and Riedl 2004).  
 
In order to improve the quality of recommendations, it is very important to identify 
the proper neighbors. Traditional collaborative filtering recommendation systems have 
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attempted to identify users’ neighbors by focusing on their preference similarity with the 
active user. Despite the popularity of this approach, it suffers from at least two limitations. 
First, since the preference is measured by the historical ratings, traditional recommendation 
systems are vulnerable to attackers who deliberately seek improper benefits by injecting 
fictitious ratings. For example, one e-retailer (e.g. Amazon) may have various products 
belonging to third party corporations on its electronic marketplace. Attackers may promote 
their own products to make them more frequently recommended (Lam and Riedl 2004). 
These attacks as termed as “shilling attacks” and this behavior may affect other e-retailers’ 
profit negatively (Burke et al. 2005, Lam and Riedl 2004, O’Mahony et al. 2004). Previous 
studies in shilling attack detections have discovered unusual ratings patterns of attacks by 
examining an individual or a group of attackers’ profile (Chirita et al. 2005; Lee and Zhu 
2012). Despite the overall advantage of attacker detection in the previous studies, the 
precision is very high when attack size or filler size is relatively large (Lee and Zhu 2012; 
Williams et al. 2007). In contrast, when the attack size or filler size is small, their 
performance deteriorates. The false positive rate is high since the attackers are not easily 
distinguishable from genuine users. Hereby, it indicates a high possibility of misclassifying 
genuine users as attackers. Since previous detection methods usually use the filtering-based 
strategies, which means that the classified attackers will be removed from the database, 
misclassifying a genuine user may influence the recommendation quality permanently. 
 
The second limitation is that none of the recommendation systems with shilling attack 
detections takes the profit of e-retailers into consideration. Predicting customers’ preference 
accurately may not be enough for e-retailers since various products have different profit 
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margins. From the e-retailer’s perspective, the ultimate goal of applying recommendation 
systems is to increase profit (Das et al. 2010). The importance of the e-retailer’s profit has 
been noticed by previous scholars.  However, most of the approaches still rely on neighbors’ 
preference by incorporating product profitability as a weight to generate recommendation. 
Each user is assumed implicitly as a genuine user. Once the neighbor’s preference is 
distorted by attackers, the recommendation quality is also affected negatively.   
 
In this study, we propose an improved approach to address the above limitations. We 
intend to integrate the profitability factor into the traditional systems under the attack 
environment. For each active user, we attempt to provide quality recommendations by 
selecting the proper users’ neighbors that control the influence from attackers while 
maximizing the e-retailer’s expected profits. We start by examining each user’s potential as 
an attacker. To avoid the loss from misclassifying genuine users, especially when either filler 
size or attack size is small, we adopt the discounting-based strategy to deal with the 
suspicious user. An attack probability is estimated for each user and his or her rating will be 
discounted based on this probability. We then find the optimal neighbor set for each active 
user, which maximizes the e-retailer’s expected profits constrained by the controlled shilling 
attacker level within a certain threshold. Generally, we intend to select the neighbors whose 
recommendations can increase the e-retailer’s expected profits and those who have no or 
little chance of being classified attackers. Finally, the selected neighbors are used to generate 
predicted ratings for active users on each unrated item.  
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We conduct an experimental study based on a real world database to show the 
effectiveness of our proposed approach. We compare our approach with two benchmark 
methods and experimental results indicate that our proposed approach can increase the e-
retailer’s expected profits without losing the recommendation accuracy. The proposed 
approach has made significant contributions to designing and implementing a profitable 
trustworthy recommendation system.  To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first 
effort that aims to provide a value-based neighbor selection (VNS) that strikes a balance 
between the consumers and retailers. From customers’ perspective, the recommendations 
from such neighbors are more helpful since they resist the influence from the attackers. From 
e-retailers’ perspective, such recommendations are more accurate to attain customers and 
they are more profitable.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we provide a brief review 
of research on recommendation algorithm, followed by an overview of the literature on 
shilling attacks and profitability-based recommendation systems. In section 3.3, we propose 
our value-based neighbor selection approach with detailed analysis. Section 3.4 summarizes 
experimental findings. Finally, section 3.5 concludes this study with implication discussion 
and potential directions for future work. 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
3.2.1. Collaborative Filtering Recommendation Algorithm 
Traditional collaborative filtering recommendation algorithm is based on Pearson 
Correlation Coefficient (PCC) (Breese et al. 1998), which is one of the most commonly used 
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algorithms. Data is represented as an (   ) user-item ratings matrix. The similarity        
between user   and   is calculated as: 
                     
∑ (      ̅ )       ̅     
√∑        ̅      ∑        ̅    
 (1) 
 
where     is a rating score of item   expressed by user  ,  ̅  is user  ’s average rating calculated 
from the set of items on which user   has recorded ratings, and J is the set of items the user   
and   both rated.  
 
The predicted rating      for user   on a specific item   is computed as: 
       ̅    ∑              ̅  
 
   
   (2) 
and     ∑ |      |
 
   ⁄  is a normalizing factor, forcing the predicted rating to be within the 
given range of     . Hence, the prediction given by the user-based collaborative filtering 
algorithm is correlated with the weighted average of other users’ preferences.  
 
3.2.2. Shilling Attack Models 
There are two types of attacks. One is the push attack, which promotes the target 
items by maximizing their ratings; the other type is the nuke attack, which denotes the target 
items by minimizing their ratings (O’Mahony et al. 2004). Hereby, the predicted ratings on 
the target items are expected to be higher in the push attack and lower in the nuke attack.  
 
Figure 3.1 shows the general attack item-rating profile, which is adapted from 
Mobasher et al. (2007). The first row lists each item   in the entire set   and the second row 
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displays the corresponding ratings. Items could be categorized into four exclusive sets: the 
selected items set  with rating denoted as     , the filler items set   with rating denoted as 
    ,  the unrated items set   with null ratings and the target items set   with rating denoted 
as      . Four types of attack model on both push and nuke attack by injecting malicious 
profiles have been found.  We discuss the general characteristics of each model below. 
Detailed information about the attack models can be found in Mobasher et al. (2007). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The Structure an Attack Profile  
 
 Random Attack: For attack profile in random attack model, its selected items set 
    . For filler items,   (  
 )           are generated across all attack profiles from one 
identical normal distribution that consists of the global mean and the global standard 
deviation across all users and all items in I. This type of filling method is named as the 
Random Filling Method (RFM).       is assigned to     , the maximum allowed rating in the 
system, if it is push attack. For nuke attack,        is assigned with     , the minimum 
allowed rating in the system.  
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 Average Attack:      in average attack model. For filler items,  (  
 ),         
are derived from an individual normal distribution consists of the mean and standard 
deviation for item   across all users. This type of filling method is named as the Average 
Filling Method (AFM). For target items,       is assigned with           if the attack type is 
push/nuke.   
 
 Bandwagon Attack: The bandwagon attack aims to increase the similarity between 
attack profiles and a large number of users by incorporating the most popular items across all 
users into  . Thus,     
         
       .  (  
 )          are generated as in the 
random attack. 
 
 Segment Attack: The segment attack has the same structure as the bandwagon attack. 
But it is designed to attack a group of users with the known preference. The selected items in 
   are from a target set of users with similar tastes. For instance, within a segment of book 
preference (e.g. fairy tale), a bunch of popular books could be selected and users who favor 
this type of book are more likely to be affected. Accordingly, if the size of    is larger, though 
increasing the risk of detection, the attack profiles will be more effective since each item can 
affect its own segment of users. If the items in    are assigned with     , the segment 
attackers can have best impact, while their risk of detection does not decrease either.  
 
3.2.3. Attack Detection 
Attack detection has been studied prolifically by researchers. One stream is to 
develop more robust and secure recommendation systems to withstand attackers. Hofmann 
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(1999) has developed the Probabilistic Latent Semantic Analysis (PLSA) method to 
characterize hidden semantic associations among objects. This method is applied by Jin et al. 
(2004) to create user cluster based on web data and also by Mobasher et al. (2003) to the 
collaborative filtering. In both studies, applying PLSA increases the accuracy and stability 
over the traditional collaborative filtering algorithms.  
 
The second stream of research deals with anomaly detection in time series. Keogh et 
al. (2006) and Zhang et al. (2006) have explored the problem of locating discords. Brutlag 
(2000) has integrated an exponential smoothing model and Holt-Winters forecasting into the 
Cricket architecture for network traffic analysis. Lakhina et al. (2005) have found using 
packet features distributions could also facilitate detection on network traffic analysis.  
 
Another stream of research aims at filtering attack profiles. Mehta et al. (2007) detect 
a set of attackers using principal component analysis with the assumption that the attacker 
number is known. Williams et al. (2006) discuss how to dealing with attackers when their 
profiles are obscured. Chirita et al. (2005) propose metrics that can measure and identify the 
attacker’s profile before developing recommendations. Williams et al. (2007) adapted certain 
metrics and proposed the detection method names as Classification-Based Approach (CBA). 
Since the CBA need to train classifier, attacks with unknown types are not applicable. Lee 
and Zhu (2012) introduced a two-phase procedure for attack detection by analyzing the 
difference between attacks and genuine users as a group. Despite that the detection accuracy 
improves significantly, the precision is still not satisfied.  
 
70 
 
 
 
3.2.4. Value Based Collaborative Filtering 
The profitability of recommendation systems for e-retailers has been noticed by 
scholars in recent years. Shani et al. (2002) proposed a Markov decision processes (MDP) 
model that took the expected profit of the recommendation into consideration. Despite the 
commercial value of this approach, it is not applicable when we do not know the 
chronological order for customers to select the recommended item. Liu and Shih (2005) 
proposed that recommendations could be generated based on the customer lifetime value, 
which is evaluated by customers’ recency, frequency, and monetary (RFM). This method 
requires a detailed record of customers’ historical transactional time and behavior. When 
relationship information among users could be obtained, Akoglu and Faloutsos (2010) 
adopted a social network analysis to provide more accurate and profitable recommendation. 
When the recommendation system has an interaction opportunity with the customer, Jiang et 
al. (2011) developed a dynamic pricing strategy to recommend products while maximizing e-
retailer’s profit. Das et al. (2010) proposed a theoretical model that maximized the e-
retailer’s profit while maintaining the similarity between the recommendation and customers’ 
real preference. However, they assumed that an accurate recommendation should already be 
predicted by other existed recommendation systems. Chen et al. (2007) designed a model 
called Hybrid Perspective Recommender System (HPRS) that always recommended the most 
profitable item to the customer. Though this approach is applicable in most cases, they do not 
consider the vulnerability under attacks.  
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3.3. Value-Based Neighbor Selection 
In this study, we propose a novel value-based neighbor selection (VNS) approach 
based on users’ similarity, the expected profitability of users’ recommendation, and users’ 
attack probability. This   method is designed for user-based collaborative filtering 
recommendation systems and it attempts to maximize e-retailer’s profit while coping with the 
attackers. Only push attack is discussed in this study. In this section, we describe the 
proposed approach in details. 
 
3.3.1. Problem Definition 
Given an active user, VNS method can be applied to form a proper group of users 
who play a role in generating recommendations. We call the selected users as the neighbors 
of an active user. Hence, the inputs to the VNS method include two types of data. One is user 
information, e.g., historical user-item rating matrix. The other is item information, e.g., item 
profit. The outputs from the VNS method are lists of selected neighbors. 
 
Denote a user as    with k=1 , . , . K. The rating for    on item    is denoted as     . 
Given the user’s historical rating pattern, we can evaluate the attacker probability for    as 
     (0, 1). The evaluation process will be discussed in details in the next subsection.  
 
Let J be the total number of items in the database and    stands for the item j, where 
j=1 , . , . J. For each item   , its unit market price and its unit cost are denoted as   and    
respectively, j=1 , . , . J. The corresponding unit profit for item   , denoted as   , is calculated 
as the difference between   and   , j=1 , . , . J.   
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For each active user    in need of recommendation on items      , where l<n<J, we 
intend to predict   ’s rating on those items,  based on   ’s neighbors’ rating on them  as well 
as the similarity or the relative influence (weight) from another user    on user   .  The 
similarity is denoted as       . It can be calculated based on    and other users’ historical 
rating through (1). Finally, the decision variable    = [  
 ,   
 ,….  
 ,….  
 ] denotes the 
neighbor selection list for active user   , where   
  = 1 if the user uk is selected as a neighbor 
and   
  = 0 when the user    is not selected.  
 
3.3.2. The Proposed Method 
When selecting neighbors for each active user, the VNS method takes into account of 
both the active user’s preference and the e-retailer’s profit. More specifically, it follows two 
principles: 
1) To predict   ’s preference more accurately, the influence from potential attackers 
should be limited. 
2) To maintain e-retailer’s profit, the expected profit of the recommendation 
generated from the selected neighbors for    should be maximized.  
 
Hereby, our goal is to maximize the e-retailers’ expected profit while controlling 
attackers level in the neighbors below a threshold τ. The shilling attacker level, which is 
defined as the mean of the number of attackers in the neighbor list, could be evaluated as the 
sum of each user’s attacker probability. Since in the electronic systems, users are 
independent from each other and each user has its own probability to be an attacker.  Thus 
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the attacker distribution in the entire user population follows a Poisson binomial distribution. 
Accordingly, we discuss the process of evaluating attacker’s probability and the expected e-
retailer’s profit in the following subsections. 
 
3.3.2.1. Shilling Attacker Probability 
To estimate the probability of each user as an attacker, we should first discover the 
characteristics of attackers. Previous scholars have already conducted a series of studies on 
shilling attack detection based on attackers’ rating pattern (Chirita et al. 2005; Lee and Zhu 
2012; Mobasher et al.2007). Two features of attackers’ rating have been widely recognized. 
First, the extraordinary ratings pattern of attack profiles has been attributed and metrics to 
measure such a pattern has been developed. For example, as discussed in Chirita et al. (2005), 
Rating Deviation from Mean Agreement (RDMA) is adopted to identify attacker by 
examining the user profile’s deviation of agreement with other users on a set of items. 
However, this approach is not successful in the case of larger attack size (Chirita et al. 2005). 
Lee and Zhu (2012) proposed the metric as Group Rating Deviation from Mean Agreement 
(GRMDA), which measures each cluster of user profile’s deviation from the overall mean 
agreement. The GRDMA is measured by 
          {| ̅        |  (
   
 
   
)
 
},           , (3) 
where    is the number of items rated by users classified into cluster  ;  ̅    is the average of 
the ratings for item   rated by users classified into cluster  ;    
  is the amount of ratings of 
item   rated by users classified into cluster  ;      is the average of the ratings for item   
rated by all users, and     is the amount of ratings of item   rated by all users;  
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The basic rationale behind applying GRMDA is that the target items of attackers are 
usually unpopular in push attack. Thus, the target items have only a few, but high rating so 
that the attackers are inclined to have unusual ratings. Hereby, once such users are found 
within a cluster, the GRMDA value will be higher than clusters of genuine users. Details can 
be found in Lee and Zhu (2012). 
  
Second, attackers are more likely to behave similarly to other users in the system in 
non-target items so as to affect recommendations effectively (Chirita et al. 2005; Lee and 
Zhu 2012; Mobasher et al.2007). The more similar between two users, the smaller the 
distance between them is in the space. Thus, this feature can be evaluated by calculating the 
distance between one user and all other users by adopting Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) 
approach (Lee and Zhu 2012). The user with a smaller average distance has a higher 
possibility as an attacker.  
 
Therefore, in this study, we adopt GRMDA along with average distance to estimate 
the probability of each user as an attacker. The basic procedure is depicted below. 
 
Step 1:         Calculation. 
Following Lee and Zhu (2012), calculate        for each user cluster. Select the 
user cluster      which has the highest GRMDA. For users not in the cluster      , their 
shilling attack probability is 0 (    , k=1 , . , . K, &         ). 
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Step 2: User-User Distance Calculation. 
For all users in the cluster Cmax, calculate user-user distance in g-dimensional MDS 
space based on their user-rating matrix. For each user, summarize and average its distance 
with all other users in the system, denoted as       (k=1 , . , . K &         ). 
 
Step 3: Attacker Probability Estimation.  
Find the mean and the minimum of all users’ average distance 
(                      in the cluster     . Then normalize and translate the values in the 
average distance into an attack probability in value [0, 1]. We choose the transformation 
approach as shown in (4) such that the user with the lowest average distance has the highest 
probability to be an attacker. Also, the users with very high average distance (i.e. greater than 
the mean) are assigned 0 for attacker probability.  
For [                   -----> [0, 1] 
                               
   
 
     
( 
              
                  )                                                                               (4) 
                                                                       
3.3.2.2. Expected E-retailer’s Profit 
For the active user    , the expected e-retailer’s profit obtained from recommendation 
systems is given by    ∑        
   
   , where      is the predicted rating for active user    on 
item    and    is the profit for item   .  Moreover, in the user-based collaborative filtering 
recommendation systems, the active user’s predicted rating is correlated with the neighbors’ 
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rating and the similarity between    and neighbors. Accordingly, the expected e-retailer’s 
profit for     from the selected neighbors is equivalent to 
    ∑    ∑      
   
   
   
            .                                                                            (5) 
 
Therefore, by taking into account of the shilling attacker level as well as the expected 
e-retailer’s profit, the VNS method for the user-based collaborative filtering recommendation 
systems is proposed as follows: 
         ∑ ∑      
   
   
   
                                                                               (6.1)                                                                                         
       ∑        
   
                                                                                                        (6.2)                                                                                                     
           ∑     
   
                                                                                                               (6.3)         
                                                                                                                        
This approach is designed to maximize the profits of the e-retailer when selecting 
neighbors to generate recommendation for each active user (6.1) while maintaining the level 
of shilling attackers existed in the selected neighbors is below the controlled level (6.2). In 
addition, constraint (6.3) makes sure that at least one neighbor is selected to each active user 
at each time. Since    is a binary variable that indicates whether or not a user is selected as a 
neighbor, we can identify the potential undesirable outcome. That is, if a user’s individual 
attack probability is higher than  , it is always excluded from the neighbor list.  
 
3.3.3. An Illustrative Example 
Now, we present step by step the operations of the method proposed above through 
an illustrative example.  There are two types of inputs to the VNS method, 1) the item sample 
profit array, as shown in Table 3.2; 2) the users’ item rating matrix, as shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 User-Item Rating Matrix 
     i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8 i9 i10 i11 i12 i13 i14 i15 i16 i17 i18 i19 i20 i21 
u1 8 0 0 8 0 7 7 8 0 0 0 5 10 0 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 
u2 0 1 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 
u3 0 0 6 0 4 0 7 4 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 4 0 0 3 0 2 
u4 0 0 8 0 4 5 3 0 3 10 7 5 8 5 0 4 0 0 0 8 4 
u5 0 0 0 0 6 5 7 0 7 0 0 7 8 0 0 0 0 5 0 8 0 
u6 6 0 0 5 8 3 5 8 3 8 0 0 10 0 3 6 0 3 0 8 6 
u7 0 0 9 3 9 0 3 6 1 0 7 6 0 7 0 0 0 3 9 0 2 
u8 0 9 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 
u9 8 5 9 7 4 1 0 0 1 10 7 3 0 7 3 0 4 1 8 0 0 
u10 6 0 9 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
u11 10 0 0 0 6 7 3 6 0 0 0 7 10 0 0 8 9 0 0 0 8 
u12 10 8 8 5 0 7 9 6 0 10 0 5 0 0 9 0 6 5 6 0 0 
u13 0 3 9 0 8 0 3 0 5 10 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
u14 6 7 9 0 0 5 0 0 0 9 9 0 8 0 0 4 7 0 9 0 0 
u15 0 8 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
u16 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
u17 6 7 9 0 9 0 0 6 6 8 7 0 10 4 4 4 2 3 8 8 0 
u18 0 9 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 8 4 6 0 9 8 4 
u19 (A1) 0 6 7 0 10 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 
u20 
(A2) 
0 7 8 0 10 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 
   6 1 7 0 8 0 5 4 0 10 0 0 8 0 0 4 - - - - - 
 
Table 3.2 Item Profit Array 
Item Profit Item Profit Item Profit 
i1 36 i8 58 i15 64 
i2 38 i9 65 i16 110 
i3 70 i10 26 i17 99 
i4 123 i11 23 i18 87 
i5 195 i12 93 i19 56 
i6 151 i13 35 i20 33 
i7 111 i14 65 i21 73 
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 Table 3.3 Pre-processed information in the database  
User           
∑    
   
   
    
      
 ∑      
   
   
   
User           
∑     
   
   
    
      
 ∑     
   
   
   
u1 0.76 0 1949 1481.24 u11 0.33 0 2147 708.51 
u2 0.84 0 429 360.36 u12 0.55 0 792 435.6 
u3 0.10 0 688 68.8 u13 0.88 0 264 232.32 
u4 0.77 0 1763 1357.51 u14 0.59 0 988 582.92 
u5 0.00 0 1389 0 u15 0.87 0.49 870 756.9 
u6 0.56 0 1407 787.92 u16 0 0 504 0 
u7 0.76 0 986 749.36 u17 0.60 0 1518 910.8 
u8 0 0 0 0 u18 0.24 0 1426 342.24 
u9 0.51 0 788 401.88 u19 0.72 0.17 870 635.1 
u10 0.65 0 168 109.2 u20 0.80 1 870 700.16 
 
 
In this example, we have 18 users (u1 ~ u18) with 21 items (i1~ i21). The rating range is 
from 1 to 10. The shilling attacker level τ is kept at 0.5. The attackers’ profiles are simulated 
based on the bandwagon attack model with AFM. The filler size and the attack size are both 
set as 10%. Hence, two attackers’ (A1 and A2) profiles are generated and their target items is 
   .  
 
Step 1: Estimate the attacker probability for each user (    by following steps shown 
in section 3.2.1.  
Step 1.1: select the cluster with the highest GRMDA, which containing user 
(               .  
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Step 1.2: calculate the average of all of the distances between each selected user    
and the other users in the g-dimensional space. The results are:        0.634,         
0.398,         0.432 and         0.361.  
Step 1.3: calculate    through (3). The output is shown in Table 3.3.  
 
Step 2: Retrieve the target customer’ (  ) profile (shown in Table 3.1) and calculate 
the similarity matrix between    and   ~   , as shown in Table 3.3. In this example, the 
predicted items for    are        . 
 
Step 3: Calculate ∑      
   
      for k = 1~20 and the results are listed in Table 3.3.  
Therefore, the problem is constructed as: 
Max: 
1481.24*  +360.36*  +68.8*  +1357.51*  +0*  +787.92*  +749.36*  +0*  +401.88*
  +109.2*   +708.51*   +435.6*   +232.32*   +582.92*   +756.9*   +0*   +910.8*
   +342.24*   +635.1*   ; 
s.t. 0.49*   +0.17*    <0.5; 
        ∑     
    
   ;                      
                                                                                                 
Neighbor selection results:     is excluded from neighbors in any cases and     and 
    can not be selected simultaneously. Since selecting     has a higher expected profit for 
e-retailer,     is kept. In addition, if the e-retailer does not have s specific level of the 
expected profit, the neighbor selection results would be   ,   ,    ,        ,   ,    ,    , 
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   ,   ,   ,    ,          and    . The recommendation for    could be generated based on 
the selected neighbors.  
 
3.4. Experimental Results 
In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed VNS method. We use a 
Book Crossing database from GroupLens Research (http://www.grouplens.org/), consisting 
of approximately 1,149,780 ratings (explicitly and implicitly) provided by 278,858 users for 
271,379 books. Since we focus on recommendation based on explicit rating in this study, a 
subset of 185,973 books, 77,805 users, and 433,671 ratings is considered.  
 
In order to address data sparsity problem, data reduction is a necessary approach. The 
original subset is reduced according to the number of rating for each user (no less than 20) 
and the rated frequency of each book (no less than 50). After pre-processing, we remove 
rating records from books that are rated infrequently or those from users who having rated 
relatively few books. In addition, the data set provides the ISBN of each book as well as 
other related information. We have collected the post price for those books from 
Amazon.com based on the same book format. Due to the confidentiality, we are not able to 
gather the actual cost of books. Therefore, we estimate the cost and profit by following two 
previous studies (Jiang et al. 2011, Sampson 2007) and adopt the information distribution U 
(0.60, 0.80) of the posted price. The books without any price information are also removed in 
this study. Finally, a subset of 1836 books, 866 users, and 12619 ratings is obtained. The 
ratings were expressed in a scale from 1 to 10. 
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In order to examine the performance of the proposed method, we prepare two sets of 
users: testing and training. We randomly select 20% of the users into the test set and the 
remaining 80% of the users into the training set. Therefore, neighbors for all users in the test 
set will be selected from users in the training set. We also withhold 20% of the book ratings 
as predicted items for the test users to make prediction and the remaining 80% of the ratings 
are used to calculate the similarity between users in two sets.  
 
3.4.1. Accuracy-Based Performance Evaluation 
To validate the performance of the proposed method, we compare our VNS approach 
with different benchmarks. Since the VNS intends to maximize profits while detecting 
attackers, we compare the VNS with both attacker detection model and profit-driven model. 
First, we compare the VNS with the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) and shilling 
attack detection (SD) method by Lee and Zhu (2012). In the experiments, we first employ 
VNS and SD to select proper users and then generate ratings for the predicted items. For 
PCC, we directly generate ratings based on all users in the training set. Thus, in order to 
compare the effectiveness of different methods, we adopt MSE to compare the predicted 
rating and the actual ones, which is given by: 
     
 
∑ ‖    ‖    
∑ ∑ (      ̂   )
 
          
 (7) 
where      is the actual rating of user   on item  ,  ̂    is the corresponding predicted 
rating by the recommender method,      is the set of items that the user   has rated and    is 
all the users in the test group.  
 
82 
 
 
 
For training set, we simulate attackers based on the random attack model, the average 
attack model and the bandwagon attack model with AFM. For each type of attack model, we 
vary the attack size {3%, 5%, 10%} and the filler size {5%, 8%, 15%, 25%, 40%, 60%, 
85%}. The shilling attacker level threshold is kept at 0.5. Only push attacks are simulated in 
this study.  
 
    For all methods in comparison, the profit is evaluated by total expected profit 
(TEP): 
                                                     ∑ ∑  ̂                                                  (8) 
where    is all the users in the test group, and      is the set of rated or selected items.  
  
The experimental results are summarized in Tables 3.4 and Table 3.5. In Table 3.4, 
the comparative results corresponding to the MSE between our proposed method and two 
benchmark methods (PCC and SD) at seven different filler sizes are reported in seven 
columns respectively. In Table 3.5, the comparative results corresponding to the expected 
profit between our proposed method and two benchmark methods (PCC and SD) at seven 
different filler sizes are reported respectively as well. From Table 3.4, we can see that if the 
attack model is random attack or average attack, the MSE of our proposed method has the 
obvious advantage, in particular when the filler size or the attack size is small. Another 
interesting finding is that if the attack mode is random or average, and the filler size or attack 
size is low, the MSE of the SD, which is the effective detection method developed in 
previous study, can be larger than that of the PCC, which does not discriminate shilling 
attackers at all. It is since in such environment, SD suffers both high false positive rate and 
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low true positive rate. Despite that PCC does not filter out any attackers, all genuine users are 
kept in the systems so that it would not lose any information. For the VNS method, since we 
provide the probability rather than a binary decision for suspicious users, the information 
they containing can be reserved. This finding further confirms the necessarily of using the 
discounting-based strategy instead of the filtering-based strategy.  
 
Although SD is very effective when the attack model is bandwagon, we can see that 
the MSE of our proposed VNS method is still slightly smaller than those from SD and 
consistently smaller than those from PCC.  In addition, from Table 3.5, we can see that our 
proposed VNS method yields consistently larger expected profits than those from SD and 
significantly larger than those from PCC. In general, the experimental results show that our 
proposed method maximizes profits while maintaining the prediction accuracy very well 
compared to the benchmarks.  
 
Since SD has a relatively better performance in the bandwagon attack model, we 
further examine the impacts of attack and filler size on methods performance for the 
bandwagon attack model. The results are shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. As we can see 
from Figure 3.2, as the filler size decreases, our proposed method performs better (i.e. 
generates smaller errors in comparison with SD and significantly better than those from 
PCC).  In a similar fashion as we can see from Figure 3.3, as the filler size becomes smaller 
and smaller, our proposed method produces larger expected profits than those from SD and 
PCC. Overall, the advantage of VNS to SD on both accuracy and profit is especially large 
when the filler size is small.  
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Table 3.4 Comparative Results for MSE 
Attack Type 
Attack 
Size 
Method 
Filler Size 
5% 8% 15% 25% 40% 60% 85% 
Random Attack 
3% 
VNS 0.6226 0.6192 0.6107 0.615 0.6242 0.6243 0.6243 
PCC 0.623 0.6235 0.6322 0.6356 0.6387 0.651 0.6523 
SD 0.832 0.7235 0.6302 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 0.6257 
5% 
VNS 0.6232 0.6203 0.6132 0.6155 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
PCC 0.6243 0.6256 0.6328 0.6363 0.6392 0.6525 0.6551 
SD 0.7636 0.7326 0.6245 0.6256 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
10% 
VNS 0.6235 0.6216 0.6168 0.6172 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
PCC 0.6264 0.6277 0.6255 0.6378 0.6431 0.6533 0.6589 
SD 0.7325 0.7129 0.6259 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
Average Attack 
3% 
VNS 0.6228 0.6205 0.6145 0.6152 0.6241 0.6243 0.6243 
PCC 0.6235 0.6238 0.632 0.6362 0.6428 0.6556 0.6612 
SD 0.6936 0.6266 0.6256 0.6258 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
5% 
VNS 0.6236 0.621 0.6169 0.6185 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
PCC 0.6252 0.6266 0.6322 0.6368 0.6432 0.6562 0.6621 
SD 0.6258 0.6256 0.6255 0.6252 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
10% 
VNS 0.6239 0.6222 0.6172 0.619 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
PCC 0.6282 0.6289 0.6361 0.6392 0.6477 0.6569 0.6696 
SD 0.6256 0.6252 0.625 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
Bandwagon Attack 
(AFM) 
3% 
VNS 0.6258 0.6249 0.6196 0.6193 0.6203 0.624 0.6243 
PCC 0.626 0.6269 0.6333 0.6408 0.6396 0.6543 0.6543 
SD 0.6259 0.6253 0.625 0.6248 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
5% 
VNS 0.6251 0.6247 0.6192 0.6217 0.6242 0.6243 0.6243 
PCC 0.6271 0.6285 0.6324 0.638 0.6464 0.6571 0.6663 
SD 0.6252 0.625 0.6247 0.6246 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
10% 
VNS 0.6243 0.6241 0.6236 0.6226 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
PCC 0.6295 0.6327 0.6481 0.6485 0.6492 0.6582 0.6781 
SD 0.6251 0.6247 0.6246 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 0.6243 
 
                                Note. Cell Value is Prediction Accuracy based on MSE 
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Table 3.5 Comparative Results for TEP 
Attack Type Attack Size Method 
Filler Size 
5% 8% 15% 25% 40% 60% 85% 
Random Attack 
3% 
VNS 2355 2369 5528 5682 4520 2490 2490 
PCC 1915 2086 2056 2220 2035 1881 1963 
SD 1888 2211 2135 2228 2490 2490 2490 
5% 
VNS 2463 3123 4835 5523 3974 2490 2490 
PCC 1931 1802 1772 2012 1692 1982 1882 
SD 2082 2192 2212 2306 2490 2490 2490 
10% 
VNS 2892 3321 3183 4231 3981 2490 2490 
PCC 1710 1821 2184 2362 2188 1836 1928 
SD 2382 2186 2358 2490 2490 2490 2490 
Average Attack 
3% 
VNS 2390 2682 5210 5370 4282 2490 2490 
PCC 1820 1932 2026 2216 1872 1966 1798 
SD 2320 2298 2388 2420 2490 2490 2490 
5% 
VNS 2328 2688 4382 3890 2490 2490 2490 
PCC 2026 2036 1828 1956 1938 1898 1828 
SD 2156 2278 2430 2456 2490 2490 2490 
10% 
VNS 2396 2796 4188 3992 2490 2490 2490 
PCC 1628 1722 1838 2026 2236 1936 1826 
SD 2312 2368 2462 2490 2490 2490 2490 
Bandwagon Attack (AFM) 
3% 
VNS 2360 2350 5470 5630 4860 3220 2490 
PCC 1912 1915 2013 1820 1792 1586 1586 
SD 2069 2100 2150 2280 2490 2490 2490 
5% 
VNS 2310 2370 5662 4280 2530 2490 2490 
PCC 1810 1970 2480 1850 1610 1550 1630 
SD 2080 2150 2320 2430 2490 2490 2490 
10% 
VNS 2338 2880 3260 2980 2490 2490 2490 
PCC 1730 1990 1635 1782 1629 1582 1562 
SD 2380 2320 2510 2490 2490 2490 2490 
                   
                    Note. Cell Value is Expected Profit  
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Figure 3.2 Impact of Filler Size and Attack Size on Prediction Error 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Impact of Filler Size and Attack Size on Expected Profit 
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3.4.2. Value-Based Performance Evaluation 
Second, we compare the VNS with the HPRS brought by Chen et al. (2008), which is 
the pure profit-driven method. Since the HPRS model does not consider the effect of 
attackers, its vulnerability on attacks is weak. Thus, we compare our method with an 
integrated approach (SD+HPRS), which firstly uses SD to remove attackers and then 
recommends the similarity-based profitable product. Since SD is more effective under the 
bandwagon attack model, we simulate attackers only based on the bandwagon attack model 
with AFM. Still, we vary the attack size {3%, 5%, 10%} and the filler size {5%, 8%, 15%, 
25%, 40%, 85%}. 
 
Since the output of HPRS is a list of recommended items, after generating the 
predicted rating for each predicted item, we select the top N items with the highest rating. In 
the testing dataset, items are categorized as “like” if the actual rating is 10 and “dislike” if the 
actual rating is below 10. Also, we choose precision, recall and F1 to compare performance, 
as shown in (9), (10) and (11).  
 
           
             
                            
       (9) 
        
             
                            
   (10) 
           
                  
                
   (11)  
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Table 3.6 Comparative Results between VNS and (SD+HPRS) method 
 VNS SD+HPRS 
(Attack%, Filler%) Precision Recall F1 TEP Precision Recall F1 TEP 
(3%, 5%) 0.682 0.569 0.6203 137 0.359 0.280 0.314 140 
(3%, 8%) 0.679 0.566 0.6174 137 0.358 0.280 0.315 139 
(3%, 15%) 0.681 0.567 0.6188 126 0.358 0.281 0.315 138 
(3%, 25%) 0.688 0.570 0.6235 126 0.358 0.280 0.315 139 
(3%, 40%) 0.681 0.566 0.6182 130 0.362 0.282 0.317 139 
(3%, 85%) 0.684 0.570 0.6218 137 0.358 0.280 0.315 139 
(5%, 5%) 0.68 0.583 0.6278 137 0.357 0.280 0.314 140 
(5%, 8%) 0.671 0.560 0.6105 141 0.359 0.279 0.314 140 
(5%, 15%) 0.683 0.568 0.6202 137 0.359 0.281 0.315 139 
(5%, 25%) 0.681 0.567 0.6188 137 0.358 0.281 0.315 138 
(5%, 40%) 0.671 0.558 0.6093 130 0.364 0.285 0.319 139 
(5%, 85%) 0.68 0.565 0.6172 137 0.364 0.285 0.319 139 
(10%, 5%) 0.681 0.576 0.6241 137 0.358 0.280 0.315 140 
(10%, 8%) 0.685 0.566 0.6198 139 0.359 0.281 0.315 140 
(10%, 15%) 0.682 0.568 0.6198 137 0.358 0.281 0.315 138 
(10%, 25%) 0.684 0.571 0.6224 137 0.364 0.285 0.319 139 
(10%, 40%) 0.676 0.567 0.6167 130 0.364 0.285 0.319 139 
(10%, 85%) 0.682 0.578 0.6257 137 0.364 0.285 0.319 139 
 
Table 3.6 displays the comparison between VNS and the integrated SD+HPRS 
approach. The later approach selects items based on the similarity based expected profit. 
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Despite its advantage in profit, we can see that the TEP generated by VNS is comparable, if 
not better.  From the accuracy perspective, though it adopts SD to overcome the influence 
from attackers, VNS has a significant advantage on all three measures over those from 
(SD+HPRS). Hereby, our proposed method achieves a balance between users’ expected 
satisfaction and e-retailer’s profit. 
 
3.4.3. Performance Discussion 
In this subsection, we discuss the possible underlying reasons behinds the advantage 
of our proposed VNS over our benchmarks on both accuracy and profit is especially large 
when the filler size is small. 
 
We evaluate the detection techniques by artificially adding simulated attackers into 
the original database. When the filler size is small, there is a possibility for SD method to 
misclassify a genuine user as an attacker. And for SD, each user has a binary decision. The 
user will be removed once recognized as an attacker. If information provided by this user is 
valuable, the prediction error will increase. Differently, for VNS, each user will be assigned 
an attack probability and he/she will be removed in one of the two situations: 1) the attacker 
probability is very high, which indicates that this genuine user has a high similarity with the 
simulated attackers compared to other genuine users. In this case, this genuine user, though 
not a simulated attacker, is a “natural” attacker existing in the original database. Hereby, 
identifying it as an attacker is actually not a misclassification. Removing it from the database 
can increase the prediction accuracy; 2) the expected profit from the recommendations 
generated by this user is very low. In this case, removing this genuine user may increase the 
profit. Therefore, removing a user does not harm the performance of VNS. 
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With the increases of the filler size, the performance difference between VNS and SD 
narrows. It is since when filler size increases (i.e. filler size>40%), SD is more easily to 
remove all attackers as they have a greater chance of being dissimilar to other users. Thus, 
when the filler size is large, the selected users by SD are the entire training set without 
simulated attackers. For VNS, based on the discussion in Section 3.3.1, user   will be 
assigned a higher attack probability if       is closer to        . When filler size increases, 
all simulated attackers tend to be gathered at the center of all users (Lee and Zhu 2012). The 
distance between all attackers with any other genuine users will be shortened and the distance 
among attackers are close to zero. Hence,         is more likely to belong to one simulated 
attacker and          ,        will decrease significantly. 
 
Other simulated attackers are also expected to have a smaller       and a higher 
attacker probability. But for a genuine user  , the distance from the attackers will be 
shortened but that with other genuine users will not vary. Since the attack size is small, the 
distance with other genuine users is much larger than that from the attackers. Hereby, while 
      may decrease slightly, it is further away from        and even may surpass         . 
Accordingly, its attack probability will decrease or be assigned as a zero. This trend is also 
true for the “natural” attacker. The increasing filler size does not affect his similarity with 
other genuine users, which takes the majority of the overall distance. Its attacker probability 
decrease as well. Thus, the genuine users are not likely to be removed as attackers. For VNS, 
its selected users for recommendations are the entire training set without simulated attackers 
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as well. This is why the two methods share similar results, which are consistent with those 
shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. 
 
The advantage of VNS to PCC is as expected since PCC in itself, is neither attackers 
focused nor profit focused. For PCC, its prediction error increases when either filler size or 
attack size increases since more misleading information is injected by attackers. Thus, the 
expected profit for e-retailers is affected. 
 
3.5. Discussion and Future Research 
Recommendation systems have been shown to be effective for customer retention in 
various domains. However, retaining customers, while positively related to, is not always 
equal to maximizing the e-retailer’s profit. Even more, the systems are vulnerable to attacks.  
In this paper, we address these important issues. For collaborative filtering recommendation 
systems, its success relies on the rating of neighbors who share the same preference with the 
active user. Hereby, we design a new method to select proper neighbors. We consider the 
profitability of recommendations to increase the expected gain for the e-retailer while 
protecting the system from shilling attacks. To validate the performance of the proposed 
model, we conducted a number of experiments and compared our approach with several 
benchmarks. Results indicated that the method we proposed in this study could yield better 
overall accuracy and higher profits. This is particularly true when the filler size is small. 
Hence, from the customers’ perspective, the attacks can be detected and removed so that the 
recommendations are closer to users’ actual tastes. From the e-retailers’ perspective, our 
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approach can lead to significant financial revenue for them. This study suggests the necessity 
of adopting discounting based strategy in shilling attack detection.  
 
Future studies may also examine the cost and benefit of increasing the attack size 
when implementing the proposed method. Also, we plan to analytically evaluate how the 
selection of shilling attack level affects the performance. Further, we did not address the nuke 
attack in this study. While the advantage of the proposed method is expected to be valid, we 
intend to simulate nuke attacks in the future study to explore if any pattern exists in the 
prediction error and profit gain. Moreover, in this study, attackers are simulated by one attack 
model at one time. In the future study, a mixture of attack models is expected to be applied to 
simulate attackers, which is much closer to the scenarios in a real electronic marketplace.  
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CHAPTER 4. DESIGNING INTELLIGENT RATING SYSTEMS WITH RATING 
FRAUD DETECTION 
 
4.1. Introduction 
We are more and more reliant on Internet. For example, Amazon had 209 million 
users by July 2013(Smith, 2014).  By December 2013, 241 million global users were 
connected in Twitter to share information (Goel, 2014).  With advances in information 
technology, the cyber world has transformed itself as the dominant platform for people to 
express themselves and connect with others in many parts of their daily lives. Different from 
the real-world, the interaction in the cyber world is featured by anonymity, in that it can 
occur between people who do not know each other’s real identity. Thus, Internet breaks the 
geographical limitation and provides a vast collection of information sources. 
 
Despite the convenience resulting from social media for information exchange, 
interaction with strangers always involves risks. For instance, believing in the rumors 
spreading across the Internet could lead financial investors to make incorrect decisions. 
Buyers purchasing products from unreliable sellers may result in severe losses. Hence, 
people should interact with strangers cautiously to make use of opportunities as well as 
protect themselves. In the real-world, people would like to interact with entities (e.g. people, 
items, service, organizations and etc.) that have higher evaluations. Similarly, evaluation can 
be a critical precautionary measurement for people to regulate their interaction with strangers 
in the cyber world.  In the cyber world, the opinion about an entity is difficult to collect by 
direct inquiring. Accordingly, rating systems have been designed to help people to judge the 
quality of strangers beforehand.  
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Rating systems can collect, calculate, and disseminate evaluations about entities’ past 
behavior. The aggregated feedbacks are rating scores. In most commercial systems, feedback 
is contributed by users in the form of numerical ratings. In this paper, we term the user 
providing ratings as rater. For example, raters in Amazon can rate the entity in the scale from 
1-5 stars, with the higher value indicating the better satisfaction. The rating score is 
calculated based on the rating from every user and will be updated with the arrival of the new 
rating. The calculated score is disseminated to all customers as their decision reference. 
Previous research has already shown that rating system is an effective mean to decrease 
transaction risks, facilitate buyer satisfaction, and generate premiums for e-retailers (Ba and 
Pavlou 2002; Houser and Wooders 2006).  
 
In spite of its effectiveness, rating systems are vulnerable to raters’ manipulation. 
Raters may inject biased evaluation for entities to exploit their own benefits. We term the 
behavior that the rater will provide unfair ratings as rating fraud and such users are 
fraudulent raters. There are rating management organizations that provide professional 
services for online rating manipulation. For instance, nineteen review management 
companies were caught and fined $350,000 for injecting faking consumer ratings in various 
sites including Yelp, Google Local, and Yahoo Local in early 2014(Sved 2014). As a result, 
the rating score is biased by such organized and profit-driven activities. It will undermine the 
trustworthiness of the rating systems and users’ satisfaction will be lost. Therefore, it is 
necessary to develop mechanisms against rating fraud.  
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While a growing body of research has developed solutions for rating fraud, they 
suffer several limitations that are not fully addressed. In one way, the detection of the 
suspicious rater relies on the examination of his or her rating deviation from the majority 
rating or the earlier ratings (Fei et al. 2013; Jindal and Liu 2008; Lim et al. 2010; Liu and 
Sun 2010; Mukherjee et al. 2013).  This will generate misleading results when the majority 
or the early raters are fraudulent. In addition, the normal users’ rating values for a specific 
entity can have a large variance due to the subjective difference. In another way, it first 
identifies a reliable rater and utilizes his or her rating experience to filter out the suspicious 
raters by comparing similarity (Dellarocas 2000; Teacy et al. 2006). However, when such a 
reliable rating is lacking or when there are newcomers, the application of this type of method 
faces difficulty. In this study, we intend to propose the method which detects the fraudulent 
raters based on the features of the rating series rather than its deviation of values. We first 
identify the suspicious entity by fitting its rating series to the autoregressive moving average 
model. If the model has a good fit, this entity is selected as a potential attacked entity since 
its ratings are not independent. Then we retrieve a list of users who have rated this entity. For 
users in this short list, we adopt clustering-based methods to discriminate fraudulent raters 
based on their rated entities and rating timestamps.  
 
The proposed method addresses the fraudulent raters in the collaborative rating fraud. 
While a singleton can conduct a personal attack independently, the influential rating fraud is 
usually organized and planned. The collaborative fraud occurs when a seller or the rating 
management organization can control multiple users or user IDs to inject unfair ratings 
strategically on the target entity(s). Compared to the individual unfair rating, collaborative 
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rating fraud brings more significant challenges to the accuracy of the rating systems and thus 
it is the focus of the present study.  
 
In the next section we provide a brief review of research on rating fraud model, 
followed by an overview of the literature on rating fraud detection. In Section 4.3, we 
introduce the proposed two-phase procedure for rating fraud detection. Section 4.4 presents 
the experimental studies that we conducted to evaluate the method performance. Finally, 
section 4.5 concludes the papers and discusses the future research directions.  
 
4.2. Literature Review 
4.2.1. Rating and Rating Systems 
Two types of measurements for rating have been examined in electronic markets, 
which are non-computational and computational (Zaacharia et al. 2000). Non-computational 
rating does not provide a numerical value, but rather, records all the activities related to the 
opinion. A notable example of a non-computational rating system is “Better Business Bureau 
Online”, whose main functions are handling disputes and tracking complaints (Azari et al. 
2003). On the other hand, computational rating is calculated based on the evaluations 
collected from all the evaluators. For computational rating, there are two types of rating 
systems: content driven and user driven. Content driven systems (such as WikiTrust) use the 
automated content analysis to derive ratings by comparing contributed content with ground 
truth. The less frequently the content is modified, the more reliable it is. Content-driven 
rating systems face several challenges. Due to the automatic calculation algorithms, it may 
reduce the users’ belief of the scores since they do not understand the internal calculation 
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process. In addition, these systems rely on the reviews.  If everyone is lazy, the rating will be 
misleading. However, due to the visibility of the content modification to all, these systems 
are more resistant to users’ manipulation (Chatterjee et al. 2008).  Hereby, this study focuses 
on the user driven rating.  
 
User driven ratings (such as eBay and Amazon) compute the rating based on explicit 
user feedback. For user driven rating systems, the rating score can be calculated either as the 
difference between all positive scores and negative scores (e.g. eBay) (Resnick and 
Zeckhauser 2002), as the mean of all ratings (e.g. Amazon) (Schneide et al. 2000), or as the 
weighted average of all the ratings where the weight can be the rating age, the rater 
helpfulness, etc. (Liu et al. 2013). In the more complex way, for example Beta Reputation 
Systems (BRS), it utilizes the previous positive and negative ratings as parameters to 
formulate the beta probability density functions. Based on the previous rating score and the 
new rating, it can calculate the updated rating score (Jøsang et al. 2007). While it enables the 
intuitive understanding of the calculation process, user-driven systems are open to malicious 
users’ manipulation. In the next subsection, we will discuss the conventional rating 
manipulation model.  
 
4.2.2. Rating Fraud Model 
Rating fraud can be classified from several dimensions. The first dimension is the 
proportion of honest raters in the overall environment. In most cases, the majority of raters 
are honest. However, it is possible that the ratio of the malicious raters is predominant or they 
control a larger amount of user IDs. This scenario is termed as Sybil Attack (Douceur 2002). 
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The second dimension is the rating value. It can be classified as Ballot Stuffing if the unfair 
high ratings are injected or Bad Mouthing if the target entity’s rating is undermined 
(Dellarocas 2000). The third dimension is the rater’s manipulation activity. Three types of 
malicious behaviors have been found (Irissappane et al. 2012).  
 Consistent Attack: users consistently provide unfair high (low) ratings to entities 
with low(high) quality; 
 Camouflage Attack: users camouflage as honest ones by providing fair ratings 
strategically. For instances, besides unfair rating, they may also inject fair 
ratings to non-target entity to pretend as a normal user;  
 Whitewashing Attack: users register new accounts after a period of injecting 
unfair rating to whitewash their history; 
 
4.2.3. Rating Fraud Defense Mechanisms 
Various defense mechanisms have been proposed to deal with rating fraud. They can 
be classified as preventative or detective mechanisms. Preventative mechanisms intend to 
discourage fraud by increasing its costs.  For instance, by combing user accounts with IP 
addresses or using social networks to detect nodes with multiple fake identities, it will 
increase the difficulty for malicious users to control multiple IDs (Douceur 2002; Yu et al. 
2006).  Epinions encourages raters to provide honest feedbacks by sharing income with them 
(Jøsang et al. 2007).  Such preventative approaches are unable to capture fraudulent activity 
and they are ineffective when users enhance their hiding techniques (e.g. IP address spoof) or 
if they can realize more significant profits by injecting attacks.  
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Another detective solution is detecting suspicious users according to various features.  
One stream is to classify a user as a fraudulent rater by his or her rating feature. Jindal and 
Liu (2008) adopt logistical regressions with a multitude of rater characteristics including the 
ratio of the first product rating, the number of single raters, mean and variance of all his or 
her ratings. Lim et al. (2010) explore fake rating through predefined types of behavior 
abnormalities (i.e. extremely high or low ratings).  Wang et al. (2011) use the graphical 
method for rating fraud detection by considering the relationship among raters, ratings and 
entities. Mukherjee et al. (2013) exploit characteristics of abnormal behaviors and designed 
author spamicity model for detection. Fei et al. (2013) employ those features in Loopy Belief 
Propagation (LBP) with several raters’ features such as individual rating deviation, ratio of 
verified purchase to detect fraud. Liu et al. (2013) propose a fuzzy logic which combines 
user’s rating time, rating value similarity and rating quantity to against unfair ratings.  
 
Another stream compares the target user’s rating with the overall rating trend from 
other users to estimate whether it is a fraudulent user. In BRS, if the overall entity rating falls 
in the rejection areas of the beta distribution of the target user’s ratings, this user is 
considered dishonest due to the majority rule (Whitby et al. 2004). However, this method is 
vulnerable to Sybil Attack. Instead of relying on the majority rule, Liu et al. (2011) propose 
the method assuming that the entry of a large amount of malicious ratings would lead the 
sudden change of the overall rating of the entity.  Hereby, they discuss how to locate the 
rating change by comparing new ratings with previous ones. The evaluation of this method 
demonstrates increasing the accuracy and stability over the beta-function based defense 
method. However, this model may be vulnerable when the malicious users are the early raters. 
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Another method TRAVOS is proposed by Teacy et al. (2008). It evaluates the 
trustworthiness of the target user by comparing its rating of the entity with that of other 
similar entities. This method assumes that users have a constant behavior, which may not be 
the case in Camouflage Attack. 
 
4.3. Rating Fraud Detection 
In this section, we discuss the proposed method in details. This study addresses the 
collaborative rating fraud. It can be carried out by multiple users or by one user controlling 
multiple user IDs. We refer each of these users as a fraudulent rater.  Fraudulent raters have 
their target entity(s) in which they inject unfairly high (Ballot Stuffing) or low (Bad 
mouthing) ratings. They can also provide ratings beyond the target entity (or entities). 
However, for each entity, every malicious user ID can only inject one rating throughout the 
entire period. This is due to the fact that the duplicate rating detection has already been 
widely discussed and is much easily controlled (Jindal and Liu 2008).   
 
Due to the collaborative rating’s fraudulent nature, multiple malicious users could be 
associated with each target entity. Thus, our defense mechanism includes two steps: 1) 
identify the potential target entity(s) based on the entity features; 2) Retrieve the associated 
users and filter out the fraudulent raters by user features. Accordingly, we will first discuss 
two important characteristics related to rating fraud that are useful in supporting our defense 
methodology. Each characteristic is identified with empirical evidence and detailed analyses.  
We will use a real-world cyber competition dataset (Liu et al. 2011) to illustrate those 
characteristics.  This dataset includes both normal data and attack data. For each piece of 
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record, it includes both rating time and rating value. A detailed description of this data set 
will be provided in Section 4.4.  
 
4.3.1. Target Entity Rating Series 
For each entity e, we create a time series for all its ratings over the time.   
  
          
 
     
 
     
Where tk is the order for this rating instead of its accrual time. For example,      indicates 
that it is the first rating for the entity e. We use the order (relative time) instead of the accrual 
time since our concern is the correlation among ratings rather than the change of entity 
overall rating.    
 
Users have various backgrounds. Intuitively, their ratings towards an entity should be 
independent with each other if they are honest (Holmes 1994; Hu et. al 2012; Xie et al. 2012). 
Accordingly, the rating scores for a non-target entity should be mutually independent and 
identically distributed with respect to time. For example, Figure 4.1 plots    
 - } over the 
time for a non-target entity selected from our experimental data, where    is the rating the 
timestamp t and   is the expectation of all ratings.  We can find that the ratings are randomly 
distributed. However, if the entity is under attack,   
  may be correlated with each other due 
to the existence of the malicious users. In the collaborative rating fraud, fraudulent raters are 
organized together so that their ratings are not independent any more. For instance, Figure 
4.2 plots the rating time series for one target entity under three different attack sizes from the 
experimental data. One notable finding we can observe from the figure is that the ratings 
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from fraudulent raters are correlated. Hereby, an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) 
model is approximate for the target entity rating distribution, which is shown as below.  
                   
     ∑        
            ∑       
 
                                        
where     is the autoregressive and moving average model order respectively,        are the 
parameters of the autoregressive and moving average model respectively and    is the error 
term.  
 
Despite certain cases in which a self-selection process may exist so that ratings from 
normal users may not be random (Li and Hitt 2008). However, Hu et al. (2010) analyzed the 
data from Amazon and Barnes and Noble, and show that regardless of self-selection, rating 
fraud must exist in the entity if there is dependency among all its ratings. Thus, for the target 
entity, its rating series is expected to be fitted by the autoregressive moving average model. 
We can fit the rating series to the ARMA model and examine the model fit. If the model has 
a perfect fit, it is highly suspected to be the target entity.  
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Figure 4.1 Rating Time Series with Genuine Users 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Rating Time Series with Fraudulent Raters in Various Sizes 
Note. Black circle, genuine users; solid and red circle, fraudulent raters. 
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4.3.2. Fraudulent Rater Rating Series 
Fraudulent raters have fundamentally different objectives from genuine users, as do 
their behaviors. Genuine users provide ratings for the entity based on their preferences. 
Individual difference makes it difficult for a group of users to rate exact the same entities.  
The activities of malicious users are usually controlled and panned, particularly those hired 
by the organizations. Entities selected to rate by organized malicious users are different from 
those rated by normal users. For malicious users, there are two types of entities to rate: target 
and non-target ones. For target entities, they rated exactly the same set since they are 
preselected and mostly are not interested by genuine users. For non-target ones, malicious 
raters selected entities randomly in order to camouflage themselves. Despite the randomness, 
the non-target entities selected by collaborative malicious user IDs would still have a high 
similarity since several user IDs may be controlled by the same user. The user with several 
malicious user IDs may just pick up the same set of entities for convenience. Therefore, 
malicious users controlled by the same user are expected to have a similar rating pattern. This 
feature can be utilized to cluster malicious users. 
 
In addition to the rating similarity, fraudulent raters also have unique temporal 
features in their own rating series. Since a deadline is usually given, profit driven raters 
usually accomplish their tasks within a short period intensively, i.e. right before the deadline 
(Parker 2011). While a new deadline may be given in later days, the overall time interval 
between every two consecutive ratings for a malicious user should be small. This implies that 
if the fraudulent user rates more than one entity, it is highly possible that ratings are injected 
in quick succession. However, time interval between ratings for genuine users usually is 
larger since they need time for consideration before making rating decisions. 
105 
 
 
 
This phenomenon has been observed in network intrusion and mobile Apps ranking 
fraud (Soldo et al. 2009; Soldo 2011; Sorrel 2009; Zhu et al. 2013). Table 4.1 also shows an 
example from our experiments. In the entire dataset, we randomly select five genuine users 
and two fraudulent raters, and then retrieve all of their ratings. The seven users had rated a 
total of 16 entities. The cell value t
ue
 is the accrual day that a rating has been given. We can 
find that compared to the fraudulent raters, genuine users have a more widely ranged rating 
time range. We capture and define this feature as the mean rating time distance (MRD), 
which is calculated as (1): 
                                          
∑        
      
        
    
   
    
 
      
                                    
where    is the total number of entities that the user u has rated and   
  is the actual day of 
the n
th 
 rating the user u has given for all possible entities. The last column of the Table 4.1 
shows the MRD value for every user. It shows that genuine users have much larger values in 
MRD compared to malicious users. In addition, we can also note that entities rated by 
malicious users are quite similar.   
Table 4.1 An Example Rating Timestamps Distributions 
t
ue 
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8 e9 e10 e11 e12 e13 e14 e15 e16 MRD 
u1 
  
59 26 
    
100 38 
  
24 95 
  
10 
u2 
   
44 
  
125 45 44 77 
  
59 
   
8.25 
u3 124 
  
121 89 144 
  
143 
 
127 
  
150 
  
2.2 
u4 
   
86 
   
92 101 87 101 
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94 92 0.5 
u5 106 
  
121 
    
145 
 
131 
 
108 
   
7.33 
u6(f1) 14 14 
   
14 
   
14 
 
14 
 
14 
 
14 0 
u7(f2) 
 
44 
   
44 
   
44 
 
44 
    
0 
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4.3.3. Fraudulent Rater Detection Algorithm 
Based on the characteristics of the target entity and fraudulent rater discussed in the 
previous subsection, our algorithm is designed to consist of two phases. In the first phase, we 
select the suspicious entity based on the entity’s rating series and retrieve its associated raters.  
In the second phase, we examine the rating series of every rater selected in the first step and 
discriminate a set of fraudulent raters through clustering with the consideration of the mean 
rating time distance.  
 
Phase 1. Select a set of P target entities and their corresponding Q users. 
Input:  
                : (n*m) user-entity rating matrix, where                   
                : (n*m) user-entity rating time (day) matrix, where                  
Procedures: 
Step 1. For each entity e, construct its non-void rating vector    
      
 
    
 
  and its corresponding rating time vector  
        
 
    
 
  ;  
Step 2. Sort    based on the values in    in ascending order such that    
{        
 
  },        
 
     
 
    Thus,  
  {        
 
  } where     is the order for 
the rating      in the vector  
 ; 
Step 3. Initialize      =0; Estimate the proper ARMA models for  
  via Yule-
Walker method; 
Step 4. Apply Ljung–Box test to the residuals from the fitted model in Step 3 to 
detect the goodness of the fit. If there is a model has a good fit,      =1; 
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Step 5. Repeat Step 1~4 for all entities. Find the P entities with      =1; 
Step 6. Find Q users who have ever rated at least one of the P entities.  
Output: 
   ̅     : (q*m) user-entity rating time (day) matrix consisting of the selected users 
in Step 6, where                ; 
           ̅     : (q*m) user-entity rating matrix consisting of the selected users in Step 6, 
where                ; 
 
Phase 2. Select a set of fraudulent raters based on the clustering of their rating pattern. 
Input:  
           ̅        and  ̅       : the output from the phase 1; 
Procedures:  
Step 1. For each user u, calculate its mean rating time distance from  ̅           
Step 2. Construct an (Q*Q) user-user distance matrix         based on the user-
entity matrix  ̅ . The user-user distance is calculated by using (1-Tanimoto coefficient). 
Tanimoto coefficient is a general form of Jacarrd coefficient, which has shown a clear 
advantage over other similarity measures in the case of extremely asymmetric distributed or 
sparse data vectors such as in the rating data (Mild and Reutterer 2003). For user u and user i, 
      
  ̂   ̂
 ||  ̂||  ||  ̂||
 
   ̂   ̂ 
 , where   ̂ and   ̂ denoting the rating vector for their common 
rated entities respectively; 
Step 3. Cluster users into J groups based on their distance using hierarchical 
clustering method. The distance among clusters is calculated by ward’s method; 
108 
 
 
 
Step 4. For each cluster C, C=1, 2, …, J, calculate the group average MRD as 
      , which is the mean value of every user’s MRD in the particular cluster; 
Step 5. Select the cluster with the lowest GMRD. 
Output: 
The group of users selected in Step 5. They are identified as fraudulent raters and will be 
suggested to be removed from the user list.  
 
4.4. Experimental Results 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed method and present the 
experimental results. To test how accurately the proposed method can detect the fraudulent 
rater, we need to rely on test data in which the true category (i.e. either honest or not) of 
every user is already known. Even though the user-entity rating datasets are available in 
certain online systems, they seldom have the dishonest users labeled. Thus, we cannot 
evaluate the accuracy of prediction due to the lack of actual values. The common solution in 
previous studies is simulating fraudulent raters based on the assumption of their behavior 
features. However, the simulation could not reflect the realistic situations comprehensively 
so that the evaluation of accuracy may be affected accordingly. 
 
In this study, we use a cyber-competition data, which includes both normal rating 
data and attack rating data (Liu et al. 2011). In both normal and attack data, each piece of 
rating contains the entity ID, the user ID, the rating time and the rating value. The normal 
data are collected from a real e-commerce site with rating values in the numeral scale 1 to 5. 
The set contains 5688 user-entity rating records collected over 150 consecutive days from 
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300 normal users and 300 products (entities), denoted as (u1,…..u300)  and (e1,…..e300) 
respectively.  Users (u1,…..u300) are considered as honest users in this study. The attack data 
are obtained from an attack competition designed for this e-ecommerce site. The goal of the 
competition participants is downgrading the rating of one target entity (e1 in this competition).  
A participant can realize the goal by rating from multiple user IDs. Although every 
participant has the same goal in this competition, the individual behavior may vary a lot. As 
discussed in section 4.2.2, a participant may strategically select non-target entities besides the 
target entity to rate. Or it may camouflage itself by injecting fair ratings via some user IDs. 
Regardless of their attack strategy, one participant cannot inject more than 100 ratings, nor 
control more than 28 user IDs. And a user ID can only inject one rating for one entity. All the 
ratings from a participant are recorded in an attack file. There are a total of 13028 attack files 
in the attack data.  
 
For every attack file, we measure its attack effectiveness using the rating shift, 
denoted as    ̅   ̅  . The  ̅  and  ̅   represent the average rating for the target entity 
before and after the attack, respectively. Since the goal of this competition is to downgrade 
the target entity, a larger value of   indicates a stronger attack and a smaller value indicates 
the participant’s behavior is very similar to the original normal user.  For all the attack files, 
we categorize them based on their own   values into three attack level groups: weak attack 
group with   value between [0.1, 0.25), moderate attack group with   value between [0.25, 
0.4), and strong attack group with   value between [0.4, 0.55). There are 1543, 4254 and 
7231 files in each group respectively. It is consistent with the purpose of the competition that 
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the majority of participants are strong attackers. We test the detection performance of our 
proposed method in each group respectively.  
 
The effectiveness of the proposed method is tested in two cases. In the first case, we 
analyze its effectiveness using the original attack data. We add and combine the normal data 
with every attack file and check the fraudulent rater detection result. However, even though 
attack files are the “real” attack data, the result for the single attack file testing may not be 
applicable to the real world due to the limited rater pool. As discussed in section 4.2.2, the 
pool of the raters or ratings could be much larger in the real world, e.g. Sybil Attack. Hereby, 
in the second case, we demonstrate the robustness of the proposed method in various attack 
sizes by constructing multiple attack files strategically. The details of this construction 
process will be discussed in section 4.4.2. To demonstrate the incremental accomplishment 
of our method, we compare our proposed approach against a well-known benchmark, BRS 
(Josang and Ismail 2002; Whitby et al. 2004). 
 
4.4.1. Single Attack File Detection Testing 
In the single attack file detection testing, normal data is added to every attack file, 
which creates 13,028 merged test datasets. The user IDs in the attack file are labeled as actual 
fraudulent raters while those in the normal data are honest raters. One user-entity rating 
matrix and one user-entity rating time matrix are generated from the ratings in each test 
dataset. Following the two steps described in section 4.3.3, suspicious entities are first 
identified and then a group of users are retrieved as the predicted fraudulent raters. The 
effectiveness of the method is evaluated by comparing the predicted fraudulent raters with 
the actual ones.  
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We first assess the accuracy of identifying the target entities, which is the foundation 
of the following successful fraudulent rater detection. We adopt recall, as defined in (2), to 
measure among all target entities, what is the percentage of the accurately detected target 
entity.  In this competition, there is only one target entity (e1). Accordingly, for each single 
attack file testing, the recall value should be either zero or one. Meanwhile, we use false 
positive rate (FPR), as defined in (3), to calculate among all non-target entities, what is the 
percentage of the mistakenly identified target entity. Since there are a total of 299 non-target 
entities in this competition, the value of FPR = the number of false positive/299.  For each 
testing file, we calculate a pair of (FPR, recall). Then, in every attack level group, we average 
all recall values with the same FPR value.  Finally, as shown in Figure 4.3, we plot the 
overall Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for the target entity detection in each 
attack level group, with x and y axes representing FPR and recall respectively. Obviously, 
the proposed method can accurately detect the target-entity. Even in the weak attack group, 
where participants mostly pretend to be the normal users, the proposed method can still 
detect the entity e1 as the target entity. Another thing we could notice is that stronger groups 
have more non-target entitles mistakenly identified as target entities, particularly in the 
strong attack group. It is since their participants may also inject unfair ratings to the non-
target entity, which actually make those entities as the “target” ones. Ratings from 
participants in the weak attack group are mostly close to the normal users (i.e. just the fair 
rating). Even they are added to the non-target entities, if any, the entity is still not under 
attack.   
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Figure 4.3 Performance of Target Entity Detection 
 
Next we evaluate the fraudulent rater detection performance of the proposed method. 
In addition to recall, which measures the percentage of the fraudulent raters that are retrieved 
by the proposed method, we also concern the precision of the detection, which is the ratio of 
the retrieved raters that are accurately fraudulent, as defined in (4). A lower precision, even 
with a high recall, indicates a larger number of honest users are probably removed and the 
rating for the target entity will still be misleading.  
           
             
                            
         (4) 
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Table 4.2 summarizes the overall detection precision and recall of every group. On 
one hand, the results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed method.  We can observe that 
the group with higher attack level has better performance in both precision and recall 
perspectives. When the attack level is low, e.g. the weak attack group, the users behave 
similarly to the normal users so that it is more difficult to differentiate them. Thus, the recall 
value for the weak attack group is pretty low. When the attack level is high, the proposed 
method can detect the fraudulent raters accurately. In the strong attack group, the precision 
and the recall values are above 95%. On the other hand, we can see that the average recall 
value of the BRS is slightly better than that of the proposed method. Actually, the recall 
advantage is even larger when the attack level is lower. Its average precision, however, is 
significantly lower than of the proposed method in average attack level. The precision of the 
BRS in the weak attack group is below 0.5 (0.42). It indicates that more honest raters than the 
malicious ones would be removed from the systems, which will hurt the reliability of the 
systems. The results show that the effectiveness of the proposed method in discriminating the 
fraudulent raters while leaving the majority of the normal users in the systems.  
 
Table 4.2 The Overall Performance for Single Attack File 
 
Method Weak Moderate Strong 
Precision 
Proposed 0.65 0.87 0.98 
BRS 0.42 0.55 0.68 
Recall 
Proposed 0.41 0.80 0.96 
BRS 0.58 0.82 0.96 
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A more detailed analysis on the precision and recall in each attack level group for the 
two methods is presented in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5. The precision/the recall result of 
every testing file, is categorized into five intervals including [0, 0.2], (0.2, 0.4], (0.4, 0.6], 
(0.6, 0.8], (0.8, 1.0] respectively. For every attack level group, we calculate its own 
frequency in each interval. Then we plot the frequency distribution of the precision (Figure 
4.4 (a) and Figure 4.5 (a)) and the recall (Figure 4.4 (b) and Figure 4.5 (b)) in each group 
respectively. In both figures, the x-axis represents the precision/recall interval and the y-axis 
is the relative frequency value in every attack group.  Obviously, for the proposed method, 
almost every testing file in the strong attack group has very high precision and recall values. 
For the BRS, however, there are still a number of files in the strong attack group has very 
low precision. For the weak attack group using the both methods, it has 20% testing files 
with the recall values below 20%, which means only 20% of the fraudulent raters are 
successfully identified. However, the ratings from the un-identified raters may not be biased 
largely due to their near to normal behavior.  Meanwhile, we observe that the weak attack 
group using the proposed method has a relatively better performance in precision, with 
around 2% below 0.2. It indicates that the raters removed are less likely to be the honest 
users so that the rating quality can retain. Hereby, even though the detection performance in 
the weak attack group is not high, the rating systems using the proposed method may still 
maintain its accuracy. However, it is not the case for the BRS method, which has majority 
low precision values in the weak attack group. 
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Figure 4.4(a) Precision of Fraudulent Raters Detection for the Proposed Method 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4(b) Recall of Fraudulent Raters Detection for the Proposed Method 
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Figure 4.5(a) Precision of Fraudulent Raters Detection for BRS 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5(b) Recall of Fraudulent Raters Detection for BRS 
 
Based on the above observations, we further assess how the rating of the target entity 
has been affected after removing all the predicted fraudulent raters by recalculating its rating 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0 ~ 0.2 0.2 ~ 0.4 0.4 ~ 0.6 0.6 ~ 0.8 0.8 ~ 1.0
R
el
a
ti
v
e 
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 
Precision Interval 
 Precision of Fraudulent Rater Detection--BRS 
Weak Attack Group
Moderate Attack Group
Strong Attack Group
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0 ~ 0.2 0.2 ~ 0.4 0.4 ~ 0.6 0.6 ~ 0.8 0.8 ~ 1.0
R
el
a
ti
v
e 
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 
Recall Interval 
Recall of Fraudulent Rater Detection--BRS 
Weak Attack Group
Moderate Attack Group
Strong Attack Group
117 
 
 
 
shift for every testing file. As introduced earlier, we calculate the difference between the 
original rating before attack and the current rating after attack detection. The average rating 
shift for the strong attack group, moderate attack group and weak attack group is 0.0005, 
0.0108, and 0.0084 respectively. Compared to the original rating shift interval for each group, 
the impact from the fraudulent raters is trivial. Figure 4.6 displays the frequency distribution 
for the rating shift after the detection of every testing file. The x-axis represents three rating 
shift levels and the y-axis denotes the relative frequency of the rating shift for each group.  
Clearly, zero is the majority rating shift value in each group after applying the proposed 
method. For both the moderate and the weak attack group, most of their rating shifts have 
been significantly eliminated. And in the strong attack group, more than 97% of testing files 
have returned to the normal rating. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Rating Shift after Detection in Various Attack Levels 
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4.4.2. Multiple Attack Files Detection Testing 
Different from the real world, the rater size is limited in the original attack files. We 
need to create new attack files to represent more diverse attack environments by combining 
the existing attack files.  
 
We first generate attack files in various attacker sizes. Attacker size is the percentage 
of the raters who are fraudulent in the attack file. For example, 10% means there are 0.1*p 
user IDs in the attack file, where p is the total number of raters in the rating systems. Nine 
different attacker sizes are used in that we cover the situation of Sybil Attack. Specifically, 
we change the attacker size from 10% to 100% in intervals of 10%, and record the changes in 
performance in terms of precision and recall. 
 
We construct attack files for every attack size. When an attack size is selected, the 
corresponding number of the fraudulent raters is fixed. For example, suppose the number of 
the raters is M. In each attack group of the original attack data (i.e. weak, moderate and 
strong), we randomly select a certain amount of attack files which have a total of m 
fraudulent raters. We adjust the user ID in different attack files to make sure no duplicates. 
Then the selected attack files are merged together in each attack group respectively. After 
applying the proposed method, the precision and the recall of the fraudulent rater detection is 
recorded in all three attack groups. For each attack size, we repeat the experiments 500 times 
and make sure that there is no same combination of the files. Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 show 
the mean values of precision and recall achieved from the 500 experiments for the both 
methods.  Obviously, the impact of the attack size on the performance for the two methods is 
significantly different.  For the proposed method, it can be seen that the detection 
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performance is generally improving with the increasing of the attack size. For the strong 
attack group, the performance does not increase largely since it already maintains a very 
high-level accuracy when the attack size is small. For the moderate attack group, when the 
attack size is above 40%, its precision and recall values are both above 95%. Even for the 
weak attack group, its detection performances improve significantly. This is due to the fact 
that when the number of the fraudulent rates increases, more users share the similar 
behaviors so that they have a higher chance to be selected. For the BRS, however, the 
detection performance is generally decreasing with the increasing of the attack size, in 
particular for the strong attack group.  It is since when the attack size is increasing, there are 
more fraudulent raters than the honest users in the system. The BRS, which relies on the 
majority rating in the systems, will be biased in its judgment. For the weak attack group, 
since the ratings from the fraudulent raters are always close to the honest users, its 
performance is less affected by the increasing number of the malicious users. The results 
confirm the vulnerability of the BRS in the Sybil Attack.  
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Figure 4.7(a) Precision of the Proposed Method in Various Attack Sizes 
 
 
Figure 4.7(b) Recall of the Proposed Method in Various Attack Sizes 
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Figure 4.8(a) Precision of BRS in Various Attack Sizes 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8(b) Recall of BRS in Various Attack Sizes 
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of which vary from 30% to 90% in steps of 10%. Since the performance of intrusion size 
below 0.3 have already been largely covered in the single attack file testing, we do not 
discuss them in this subsection.  
 
Similarly, we construct attack files for every intrusion size in all three attack level 
groups respectively. For example, suppose the intrusion size is 30%, which means that 
fraudulent raters should rate 90 entities. In each attack group, we randomly select a N attack 
files with the number of fraudulent raters which have rated a total of (N-1+90) entities, 
denoted by AF1, AF2,…..AFN. From AF2 to AFN, their ratings for the target entity e1 are 
removed. For the non-target entities rated in these files, we will adjust their entity IDs if they 
are already existed in the AF1. Then we change the user IDs in these files to make sure that 
they are consistent with those in the AF1. Finally, the rating records in AF2 to AFN are added 
to the AF1, and the detection performance is examined for this merged file. For each intrusion 
size, we repeat the experiments 500 times. Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 show the mean values 
of precision and recall for the proposed method respectively. We do not show the results for 
the BRS here since the intrusion size has limited impact on the BRS method. Therefore, the 
performance of the BRS in both precision and recall is relatively stable, as confirmed by the 
experiments. But we can see that compared to the attack size, intrusion size has a larger 
impact on the method performance, since a larger number of injected ratings make the 
fraudulent raters more distinguishable from the honest users. When the intrusion size is 
above 60%, the method can detect fraudulent raters accurately in every attack group. 
Additionally, the larger the intrusion size is, the wider the difference between the normal and 
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the malicious users. Thus, the intrusion size is positively correlated with the performance of 
the method in terms of both precision and recall.  
 
 
Figure 4.9 Precision of Fraudulent Rater Detection in Various Intrusion Sizes 
  
 
Figure 4.10 Recall of Fraudulent Rater Detection in Various Intrusion Sizes 
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4.5. Conclusion 
Due to the anonymity in the Internet, it may be risky to interact with unfamiliar items 
or strange sellers. Rating systems have been shown to be effective for customers to judge the 
quality of the object and reduce the interaction-specific risk. However, rating systems are 
vulnerable to rating fraud, which will mislead the customers and further affect their 
motivation in participating into the future interaction. In this paper, we address the rating 
fraud issue and design the fraudulent rater detection method to improve the reliability of 
rating systems.  By discovering certain temporal characteristics of both the target entity 
rating series and the fraudulent rater rating series, we could discriminate the target entity and 
cluster the corresponding dishonest raters. Several experiments are conducted to validate the 
performance of the proposed method by using real-world cyber competition data. While the 
benchmarking method suffers from the low precision, our algorithm could yield better 
overall detection performance. Moreover, our methods have shown its robustness in various 
attack environments including the Sybil Attack, Consistent Attack and Camouflage Attack.  
The method proposed in this study could facilitate the organizations relying on the rating 
systems for their better customer retention. It could also help reduce the financial risk 
associated with the e-commerce transactions.  
 
We do not address the Whitewashing Attack in the present study due to data 
limitation. We believe, however, if the whitewashing fraudulent raters are using collaborative 
rating fraud strategy, our method can still discriminate them. In the future study, 
whitewashing fraudulent rater detection will be examined by simulation. In addition, our 
study focused on the collaborative rating fraud since it has more significant impact on the 
systems. Thus, our proposed method may be vulnerable to the singleton rating fraud, which 
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means the fraudulent rater does not have collaborators but just inject the unfair rating 
independently. For singleton fraudulent raters, they can be detected by examining the 
behavior deviation from the general distributions. The development of a more comprehensive 
detection framework by strategically combining our method with other research streams is 
also planned for future analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Nowadays more and more organizations are applying intelligent systems to facilitate 
their decision making. Intelligent systems are widely adopted in various industry domains 
such as banking, retailing and entertainment.  Like the human being, intelligent systems are 
capable to collect, process and analyze information in various problem domains. Due to the 
powerful computational capability, intelligent systems are advantageous in providing 
accurate, consistent and efficient decision making. However, the decision generated from 
intelligent systems highly relies on the input information. On account of diverse reasons, e.g. 
human errors or manipulations, the inputs of intelligent systems might be malicious so that 
the performance would face severe challenges. To maintain the smooth performance of 
intelligent systems, it is necessary to address the malicious input issues and design the 
corresponding defense strategies to accommodate malicious users.  
 
This dissertation endeavors to discuss the malicious user detection schemes in three 
different types of intelligent systems: intelligent expert systems, intelligent recommender 
systems and intelligent rating systems.  Each type of intelligent systems is designed for a 
unique purpose and is embedded with the distinct algorithm. Accordingly, the behavior 
pattern of the malicious user is different in each type of system and it results in three 
categories of malicious users: liars in the intelligent expert systems, shilling attackers in the 
intelligent recommender systems and fraudulent raters in the intelligent rating systems. Each 
of the three essays from Chapter 2 to Chapter 4 analyzes the influence of one category of 
malicious users on its systems’ performance, explores its features of users’ behavior patterns, 
develops the detection mechanisms based on the features, and evaluates the effectiveness of 
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the proposed methods with empirical experiments.  For all proposed detection methods, the 
general objective is to discriminate the malicious users in the systems accurately. Usually, for 
organizations with intelligent systems, higher detection accuracy of malicious users indicates 
larger profit margins. However, that is not always the case. Hereby, the development of the 
detection methods considering the profit issue is also discussed when there is a tradeoff 
between detection accuracy and profit margin. The effectiveness of variant detection methods 
in this dissertation confirms the necessity of differentiation among problem structures. In this 
chapter, it concludes the dissertation with main findings in each essay and the discussion of 
their contributions to the malicious input research area and future research direction.  
 
5.1 Conclusions 
In this subsection, we summarize the main findings and conclude each of the three 
essays. 
 
The first essay addresses the input distortion issue in intelligent expert systems. The 
methods proposed in this study explicitly differentiate liars from truth-tellers and treat them 
differently when their information is provided to redesign deductive expert systems. Two of 
the proposed methods, i.e., Split Tree (ST) and Consolidated Tree (CT), attempt to improve 
the accuracy of recommendations, and the other two, i.e., Value-based Split Tree (VST) and 
Value-based Consolidated Tree (VCT), aim to minimize the expected misclassification cost 
resulting from incorrect recommendations. Experimental results show that the proposed 
methods may lead to significant better accuracy or lower costs than that of the existing 
methods. In addition, the most accurate recommendation is not always the one with the lost 
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misclassification cost, since the recommendation of the accuracy based methods and that of 
the value-based methods are different given by the same input vector. Between the two pairs 
of proposed methods, this study finds that CT consistently outperforms ST in improving the 
accuracy of recommendations, and VCT always performs better than VST in reducing the 
expected misclassification cost. It also finds that the KM method proposed by Jiang et al. 
(2005), which essentially assumes that all users are potentially liars and treats them in the 
same manner, is not effective when there is a clear separation of liars and truth-tellers in the 
underlying population. This finding further confirms the necessity of differentiating liars 
from truth-tellers when addressing input distortion by users. 
 
The second essay explores the shilling attack issues in intelligent recommender 
systems. This study proposes an integrated Value-based Neighbor Selection (VNS) method. 
The VNS method aims to select proper neighbors for collaborative filtering recommendation 
systems so that it can maximize the e-retailer’s profit while protecting the system from 
shilling attacks. Different from the previous filtering-based shilling attacker detection 
techniques, this study utilizes the discounting-based strategies to estimate the attacker 
probability of each user. Each neighbor’s rating is discounted before being aggregated to 
generate recommendations for other users. To validate the performance of the proposed VNS 
model, a number of experiments are conducted and are compared with several benchmarks 
from both the accuracy and profit perspectives. The experimental results find that the method 
proposed in this study could yield better overall accuracy and higher profit gains. This is 
particularly true when the filler size is small. In addition, this discounting-based strategy is 
more effective than filtering-based strategies in reducing the false positive rate.  Hence, the 
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shilling attackers can be detected and their impacts are discounted so that the 
recommendations are much closer to users’ actual tastes.  
 
The third essay studies the rating fraud issue in intelligent rating systems. This study 
proposes a two-phase method for fraudulent rater detection.  For the first step, the suspicious 
entities are filtered out by conducting the time series analysis on their rating series. And for 
the second, the fraudulent raters are discriminated by using clustering based methods.  
Several series of experiments are conducted to validate the performance of the proposed 
method by using a real-world cyber competition data. It finds that the proposed method could 
yield better overall detection performance. In particular, it can lead to better precision 
significantly. Therefore, the rating system is not only protected from fraudulent raters, but the 
quality of entity ratings is also preserved. In addition, the proposed method has shown its 
robustness in various attack models including Sybil Attack, Consistent Attack and 
Camouflage Attack. It also finds that the advantage of the proposed method is particularly 
significant when the attack size or the intrusion size is high. This study further demonstrates 
the effectiveness of applying the temporal features for the rating fraud detection.  
 
5.2 Contribution and Future Research Directions 
From the methodology perspective, this dissertation proposes various novel methods 
for dealing with malicious inputs to fill the research voids in three different intelligent 
systems.  The first essay is the first study which differentiates liars from truth-tellers and 
considers misclassification costs when dealing with input noises for intelligent expert 
systems. The provision of both accuracy-based and value-based methods gives firms the 
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flexibility to select the appropriate method based on the underlying misclassification cost 
structure. Specifically, when the misclassification cost matrix is asymmetric, the VCT 
method is the most preferred. When the misclassification cost matrix is approximately 
symmetric or the misclassification costs are very difficult to estimate, the simpler CT method 
should be adopted. The method proposed in the second essay confirms the necessity of 
considering both of the e-retailer’s profit and the recommendation accuracy in the 
development of intelligent recommender systems. The method proposed in the third essay 
breaks the constraints of the precious detection methods. This study can facilitate the design 
of the intelligent rating system in diverse attack environments. 
 
From the managerial implication perspectives, the methods proposed in these studies 
can help firms to select the proper strategy to maintain their customer relationship and their 
revenue margins in various scenarios. First, to deal with the input distortion issues in the 
intelligent expert systems, the methods in Chapter 2 are applicable to the challenges in this 
area. Although the proposed methods require the verification of user-provided attribute 
values, the cost of such validation can be controlled by selecting the attributes that are 
relatively easy to verify. As a result, the expected benefit of adopting the proposed methods 
should exceed the expected cost under most real-world applications. Given the wide 
application of expert systems in various problem domains, the proposed methods can 
potentially lead to significant financial saving for organizations. Second, to deal with the 
shilling attackers in the intelligent recommender systems, the methods in Chapter 3 are 
applicable to the challenges in this domain. From the customer retention perspective, the 
attackers could be detected so that the recommendations are much closer to users’ actual 
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tastes. The customers may trust the firms, and follow their recommendations in possible 
future purchases.  From the e-retailers’ perspective, the proposed method can bring 
significant financial revenue to them. Third, to deal with the fraudulent raters in the 
intelligent rating systems, the methods in Chapter 3 are applicable to the challenges in this 
field. After removing the ratings from the dishonest users and leaving the ratings from the 
honest users in the systems, users will have more confidence on the rating quality in the 
systems and refer to them before deciding which entity to interact with. Hence, it could 
greatly reduce the financial risks of online interactions, build up secure and reliable trust 
between firms and customers and maintain firms’ long term profit.  
 
Based on methods presented in this dissertation, there are multiple potential directions 
that could be explored in the future research. One direction is extending the current methods 
to address more complex problem scenarios. First, the methods in Chapter 2 consider only 
two groups of potential users, i.e., liars and truth-tellers. Such a two-group model may not be 
sufficient to capture the heterogeneity among potential users. For instance, some users never 
lie, some may lie occasionally, while others who lie frequently. How to extend the current 
model to incorporate multiple groups of users is an interesting direction for further research. 
Furthermore, the proposed methods are computationally intensive, hence they may become 
impractical when the number of attributes or the number of states for the attributes are large. 
In the future study, one could simplify the methods to reduce their complexity. For instance, 
when computing the CT Table, it is possible that the accuracy may not degrade much even if 
it considers only a small subset of the possible true vectors given an observed vector. The 
computation time is significantly reduced if a subset of vectors can be identified and used in 
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constructing the trees. Second, attackers in Chapter 3 are simulated based on the same attack 
model each time, which means that all attackers have a similar behavior. However, in the 
real-world shilling attacks, attackers may adopt a mixture of various attack models, which 
will increase the dissimilarity among attackers. The ways to extend the current method to 
accommodate the existence of different types of attackers should be examined in the further 
study. Third, Chapter 4 focuses on the collaborative rating fraud so it may be vulnerable to 
the singleton rating fraud. Although they can be detected by examining the behavior 
deviation from the general distributions, the development of a more comprehensive detection 
framework by strategically combining the current method with other research streams is also 
planned for the future work. Finally, all methods presented in this dissertation are designed 
based on the complete, though malicious, input information. In the real-world, however, it is 
not always the case. For instance, the applicant may strategically hide certain unfavorable 
information or the user may never submit their feedbacks to the systems. If the information is 
not missing randomly, the accuracy of the decision will be affected even if the malicious 
inputs are removed completely. Thus, designing a more adaptive platform to accommodate 
both the malicious and the incomplete input is an important area of interest for the future 
analysis. 
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